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THE 1982 MINIMUM TAX
AMENDMENTS AS A FIRST STEP
IN THE TRANSITION TO A
"FLAT-RATE" TAX
MIcHAEL J. GRAETZ*

The massive body of tax legislation enacted in the first two years of the
Reagan Administration offers little guidance for predicting the future
direction of United States tax policy. Dramatically different Congressional coalitions-each led by the President-passed by very narrow
margins the nation's largest tax reduction (the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981)1 and then the next year enacted the largest peacetime tax
increase (the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982).2 In
each case, short-term political and fiscal concerns dominated the debates. The 1981 legislation reduced taxes in an effort to stimulate economic activity and investment by according substantial tax relief to
businesses and high income individuals; the 1982 legislation requires
significant additional taxes from these same sources to reduce tripledigit deficits, a reduction also deemed necessary for economic recovery.
Although the two Acts together provide for an overall reduction in
business taxes and a phased-in decrease in marginal tax rates applicable to individuals, they impart the overwhelming impression that uncertainty, confusion, and inconsistency currently dominate the tax
legislative process.
Despite the contradictory aspects of recent tax legislation, however, despair at the prospect of coherent revision of the federal income
tax may be premature. During the last Congress, twelve bills were introduced by legislators ranging across the political spectrum,3 that pro* Professor of Law, University of Southern California, and Professor of Law and Social
Sciences, California Institute of Technology; B.B.A. 1966, Emory University; LL.B. 1969, University of Virginia. I would like to thank Jerry Mashaw and Alan Schwartz for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 51 U.S.L.W. 10 (Sept. 14, 1982).
3. S. 2887, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced Sept. 9, 1982, by Sen. Mitchell, D-Me.);
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posed study or enactment of a so-called flat-rate income tax. The
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee held hearings on the flat-rate tax in July and August of 1982,-

the tax writing committees directed staff to begin work, and the Senate
Finance Committee held hearings on the idea in September of 1982,6

President Reagan voiced his tentative support of the basic concept, calling it "very tempting,"7 and press commentary has been both widespread and favorable. As a result, the "flat-rate tax" has become the
focus of current tax revision efforts.
This Article addresses the problem of the transition to a flat-rate
tax. Assuming that Congress wants to enact such a tax, how do we
move from an income tax riddled with special exclusions, deductions,
and credits to a broad-based income or consumption tax? Both political actors and professional groups, including Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole, Office of Management and Budget Director
David Stockman, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Chapoton,
H.R. 6944 & S.2817, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced Aug. 5, 1982, by Rep. Gephardt, DMo. and Sen. Bradley, D-NJ.) [hereinafter cited as Bradley-Gephardt]; H.R. 6741, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (introduced July 13, 1982, by Rep. Dreier, R-Cal.); H.R. 6628, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (introduced June 17, 1982, by Rep. Dannemeyer, R-Cal.); H.R. 6352, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (introduced May 11, 1982, by Rep. Paul, R-Tex.); S. 2376, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(introduced Apr. 15, 1982, by Sen. Grassley, R-Iowa); H.R. 6070, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(introduced Apr. 5, 1982, by Rep. Panetta, D-Cal.); H.R. 5868, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced Mar. 17, 1982, by Rep. Hance, D-Tex.); S. 2200, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced
Mar. 15, 1982, by Sen. Helms, R-N.C. (companion bill to H.R. 5513)); S.2147, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (introduced Mar. 1, 1982, by Sen. DeConcini, R-Ariz.); H.R. 5513, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (introduced Feb. 10, 1982, by Rep. Crane, R-Ill.); H.R. 4821, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (introduced Oct. 22, 1981, by Rep. Hansen, R-Idaho). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., PAMPHLET ANALYZING FLAT-TAX PROPOSALS CONSIDERED
AT SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON SEPT. 28, 1982, reprintedin DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) No. 188, at J-1 (Sept. 28, 1982) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE] (discussing current
flat-tax proposals). For a synopsis of all of these bills except H.R. 6944 and S.2817, see 16 TA
NOTES 951 app. (June 21, 1982). See also R. Hall & A. Rubushka, A Simple Income Tax with
Low Marginal Rates (Jan. 1982, revised July 1982) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the
Hoover Institute, Stanford University) (proposing a flat-rate tax, similar to an expenditure tax in
its exclusion of savings from the tax base, but with a tax base different from a broad-based expenditure tax because consumption from borrowed funds is not taxed).
4. The term flat-rate tax means different things to different people and is a misnomer since
it is commonly applied to comprehensive tax reform proposals incorporating a broadened tax base
and a flattened rate schedule regardless of progressivity.
5.
lat-Rate Tax, Hearings Before the SubcomnL on Monetary and FiscalPolicy ofthe Joint
Economic Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
6. Flat-Rate Broad-BasedIncome Taxation, Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
7. See Reagan, Dole, Stockman, Long Contribute to Flat-Rate Tax Debate [hereinafter cited
as Flat-Rate Tax Debate] and Flat-RateTax Discussion Continues on the Sidelines, 16 TAX NOTES
266, 267 (July 19, 1982).
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the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Tax Section of
the American Bar Association, have expressed particular concern with
transitional problems, citing the need to protect people who have made
economic decisions "in reliance" on the continued existence of special
tax provisions. 8
I argue here that the minimum tax amendments of the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 placed into the Internal Revenue
Code a transitional mechanism that can be regarded as a first step to
phasing in a broad-based tax. I then outline a series of future amendments to the minimum tax and other changes necessary to complete the
path to a broad-based income tax. Before proceeding to these observations, however, I first describe the flat-rate tax concept and make some
general comments on the nature of the transitional problems involved
in moving from current law to a broad-based tax with lowered rates. I

then trace the intellectual and political origins of the minimum tax provision, describe the 1982 amendments to the minimum tax, and indi-

cate why the
transition to a
ments required
status to center

minimum tax provides an appropriate vehicle for
flat-rate tax. After illustrating the additional amendto move the minimum tax from its current secondary
stage as the vehicle for transition to a broad-based in-

come tax, I demonstrate why the 1982 minimum tax amendments will

not serve an identical purpose if a broad-based consumption, -rather
than income, tax were the ultimate goal.

This Article assumes that a move to a broad-based low-rate tax is
both feasible and desirable and accepts the rather convincing case that
has been made that a broad-based income tax could be superior to

present law on economic efficiency, horizontal equity, and simplicity
grounds.9 I have also generally accepted, at least for present purposes,
8. See Statement of M. Bernard Aidinoff, Chairman, 1982-83 ABA Section of Taxation,
F/at-Rate,Broad-BasedIncome Taxation, HearingsBefore the Senate Finance Committee, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 10-11 (copy on file with Southern CaliforniaLaw Review) [hereinafter

cited as Aidinoff Testimony]; Statement of John Chapoton, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax
Policy, Fat-Rate,Broad-BasedIncome Taxation, HearingsBefore the Senate Finance Committee,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprintedin DAILY TAX REP., supra note 3, at J-10, J-15 [hereinafter
cited as Chapoton Testimony]; JoiNT CoMMiTrEE, supra note 3, at J-8 to -9; Fat-RateTax Debate,
supra note 7, at 266.
9. For examples of the ongoing debate about the merits of a broad-based tax, see Bittker,.4
"Comprehensive Tax Base"asa Goal ofIncome Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Musgrave, In Defense ofAn Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REv. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive
Income Taxatio" .4 Comment, 81 HAv. L. REv. 63 (1967); Galvin, More on Boris Bitker andthe
Comprehensive Tax Base. The Practicalitiesof Tax Reform and the ABA4s CSTR, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1016 (1968); Bittker, ComprehensiveIncome Taxation"A4Response, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1032
(1968). Much of the foregoing debate is collected in B. BrrrKR, C. GALVIN, R. MusoRAVE & J.
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the view that these goals are more likely to be realized with as uniform
and as broad a tax base and low rates as is practical. By limiting my
concern here to the problem of transition, I avoid detailed consideration of the merits of particular base broadening issues. Therefore, this
Article only briefly addresses some of the many difficult and controversial issues which will arise in the move to a low-rate broad-based income or consumption tax. I attempt here merely to demonstrate that
the problems of transition to such a regime, while important, are not
insurmountable; that in fact Congress has taken an important first step
in this direction in its 1982 amendments to the minimum tax; and suggest a general outline of subsequent steps to complete the path by
building on that first step.
I. A " FLAT-TAX" DEFINED
The unifying theme of all flat-tax proposals is a substantial broadening
of the tax base coupled with a significant reduction of marginal tax
rates. The principles underlying this theme are simple: cease the practice of regarding the income tax as chicken soup, as a potential cure for
every ill affecting society; eliminate the many exclusions, deductions,
and credits that populate the income tax; and thereby broaden the tax
base to such an extent that revenues at least equivalent to present
amounts can be raised with significantly lower tax rates.
Several justifications have been advanced for implementing a flatrate tax. Proponents of such a tax reform contend that greater economic efficiency can be achieved through the greater neutrality that
would result from broadening the overall tax base and lowering marginal rates. This greater neutrality would reduce the interference that
taxes have on the allocation of resources and mitigate the adverse impact of taxes on incentives to engage in productive economic activity. 0
PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? A DEBATE (Federal Tax Press 1968). See also
COMMISSION TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE

(Fund for Public Policy Research 1973); COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (J. Pechman ed,,
Brookings Institution 1977); UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC
TAX REFORM (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS]; Special Committee on Simplification, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Evaluation ofthe ProposedModel ComprehensiveIncome Tax, 32 TAX LAW. 563 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Simplification Committee].
10. See Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-12; Statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director,

Congressional Budget Office, Flat-Rate,Broad-BasedIncome Taxation,HearingsBefore the Senate
Finance Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprintedin DAILY TAX REP., supra note 3, at J24, J-24 [hereinafter cited as Rivlin Testimony]; JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-3. See
generally Graetz, Legal Transitions.- The Case of Retroactivityin Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA.

L. REV. 47, 64-73 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Legal Transitions](discussion of efficiency considerations in tax law).
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By the same token, a broad-based tax with lower rates could improve
horizontal equity-a widely used criterion that requires persons in similar circumstances to pay similar amounts of tax-by eliminating provisions which allow some taxpayers to reduce their taxes because of
either the source of their income or the type of expenditure." The
impact of a broad-based low-rate tax revision on vertical equity-the
distribution of the tax burden by income classes-will ultimately depend on both the tax base selected and the rate schedule that emerges. 12
Finally, proponents of broad-based low-rate taxes regard such a change
as a special opportunity to simplify greatly the operation of the income
tax. 13

Although there seems to be widespread agreement that broadening
the tax base and lowering rates is an appropriate general direction for
comprehensive tax reform, fundamental issues, as well as specific details, remain extremely controversial. When the time comes to adopt
legislation, differences over several issues will undoubtedly divide flattax proponents. While this Article adopts an optimistic attitude as to
both the feasibility and desirability of the adoption of a flat-rate tax, a
brief summary of these controversies is necessary to comprehend the
issues involved in adopting a flat-rate tax.
First, the details of base broadening will prove extremely controversial as evinced by the disparity among the twelve flat tax bills introduced in the Congress. Some of these bills would repeal all
exemptions, exclusions from income, deductions, and credits other than
personal exemptions, which in many instances would be increased.'
Other bills would retain a limited number of deductions, exclusions,
11. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-l; Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 79-81.
12. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-1; Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 81-83.
As will be developed below in greater detail, it is the apparent goal of many fiat-tax proposals to
dramatically shift the distribution of tax burdens by decreasing taxes of upper income individuals
and increasing taxes of middle and lower income individuals. Such a change in vertical equity is
not, however, a necessary aspect of broad-based tax revision proposals, but is rather a matter of
choice. See infra text accompanying notes 16-28.
13. Aidinoff Testimony, supra note 8, at 2-5; JoINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-2. Although a true flat-rate tax would provide some marginal simplification advantages over progressive rates, substantial simplification should result from a broadened, more uniform tax base with
lower progressive rates and perhaps fewer brackets. See generally BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at
42-48 (analysis of simplification resulting from broad tax base); Simplification Committee, supra
note 9,passim (same).
14. H.R. 6741, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982) (Rep. Drier); H.R. 6352, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1982) (Rep. Paul); S. 2200, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (Sen. Helms); H.R. 5513, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-3 (1982) (Rep. Crane). See also JOINT COMMIrE, supra note 3, at J-9 to -10 (describing the features of the current proposals).
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and credits.' 5 The items selected for retention, however, vary widely
among these bills.
Second, while each of the bills would substantially reduce tax
rates, a variety of rate structures have been proposed that would have
extremely different impacts on the distribution of the tax burden. 6
None of the bills recently introduced would increase the progressivity
of the tax burden compared to the present income tax, although certain
bills have been designed to achieve a distribution of the tax burden by
income class which approximates that of present law. 17 The bill introduced.by Senator Bradley and Representative Gephardt, for example,
would achieve such a result by applying rates ranging from fourteen to
twenty-eight percent to a substantially broadened income tax base.' 8
Maintaining a distribution of the tax burden by income class similar to
that of present law necessarily requires that the top tax rate be reduced
no lower than the average rate now applicable to high bracket taxpayers-estimated to be roughly twenty-five to thirty-three percent.' 9 The
Treasury Department has indicated that approximately the same degree of current progressivity could be retained by taxing a broad income base at rates of ten percent on the first $19,500 of income; twentyfive percent on amounts from $19,500 to $75,000; and thirty-nine percent on amounts over $75,000, with an exemption of $3,000 per return
and $1,000 for each dependent.2"
On the other hand, many flat-tax proposals would dramatically
redistribute the tax burden by substantially increasing the burden of
15.

See, e.g., H.R. 4821, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1981) (Rep. Hansen) (retaining exclusions

for life insurance proceeds at death, gifts and inheritances, income from discharge of indebtedness, income from recovery of bad debts, and contributions to aid construction, as well as several
deductions).
16. See generally Esenwein, An Overview of the Issues ConcerningA Flat-RateIncome Tax,

16 TAx NoTEs 947 (June 21, 1982) (determination of appropriate rate depends upon selection of
the base); Pechman & Scholz, Comprehensive Income Taxation andRateReduction, 17 TAx NOTES

63, 86-89 (Oct. 11, 1982) (discussion of variety of rate schedules); Talley, Estimatesof FatIncome
Tax Rates Using Various Tax Bases, 16 TAx NoTms 952, 956 (June 21, 1982) (flat rate will greatly
shift tax burdens without proper exemptions).
17. See JOINT COMMn-rEE, supra note 3, at J-9 to -10.
18. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 3, at 2, 4.
19. Hearings Before the Subcommr on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic
Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982) (testimony of David Bradford) [hereinafter cited as Bradford Testimony]; Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at Tables 1-4, at J-19 to -22; Pechman &
Scholtz, supra note 18, at 84.
20. Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-1 I. Fifty percent of all taxpayers, however,
would experience a tax increase, under such a schedule as a result of broadening the tax base. See
also Pechman & Scholtz, supra note 16, at 88-89 (possible to achieve a similar result with a variety
of rate schedules with a maximum 30% rate).

1983]

TRANSITION TO .4 'L,4T-T,X"

middle and lower income classes and significantly reducing the tax
share of upper income groups.2" Replacing progressive tax rates with a
flat rate would necessarily cause such a shift. The Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Tax Policy has testified that a flat sixteen percent rate
applied to a broad-based income tax (with a $5,000 exemption for a
family of four) would produce roughly the same revenues as present
law, but would result in a shift of about $32 billion in taxes from individuals with more than $50,000 of income to those with income less
than $50,000.22 Increasing the exemption to $10,000 would reduce the

amount of redistribution, but would still result in a tax reduction of $22
billion for persons with income above $50,000 and a tax increase of $27
billion for those in the $5,000-$50,000 income classes. 23 It seems reasonably certain that a top rate of approximately twenty-five to thirty
percent will be required to maintain a distribution of the tax burden
reasonably close to that of present law.24
Disposition of the progressivity issue with regard to a broad-based
which Henry Simons aptly characterized as
tax requires a judgment
"ethical-aesthetic," 25 and must necessarily be resolved through political
debate, not scholarly analysis. My own ethical-aesthetic judgment demands that broad-based tax reform not become an occasion for redistributing the tax burden from upper income classes to middle and
lower income classes.26 Professors Blum and Kalven thirty years ago
labelled the case for progressive taxation "uneasy,"'27 but the cases for
proportional or regressive taxation will no doubt prove equally uneasy.
In this Article, I therefore assume that a distribution of the tax burden
among income classes at least as progressive as under present law
should be retained in the move to a broader tax base with substantially
reduced rates.28 My concern for maintaining a distribution of a tax
21. Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-11; Pechman & Scholz, supra note 16, at 84;
Talley, supra note 16, at 956.
22. Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-10 to -11.
23. Id. at J-11.

24. See id. (top rate ranges from 25.5 to 33.6%); Pechman & Scholz, supra note 16, at 86-89
(top rate of 30%).
25. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18-19 (1938).
26. Plato's assertion that no one in society should be more than four times as wealthy as the
poorest member probably commands as much (or as little) support as John Rawls' difference
principle which provides that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions
opened to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
83 (1971). See generally Graetz, Commentary, in WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION AND THE INCOME
TAX 45, 45-50, 53 (A. Leibowitz ed. 1978).
27. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. My earlier assumption that a flat-rate tax is
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burden which is not markedly less progressive than that of current law
necessarily influences my choices in detailing the transition to a broadbased low-rate income tax.
The third difficulty of a flat-tax proposals is that there is considerable controversy about how to tax business income, especially the income of large corporations. Many of the broad-based tax revision bills
do not address the question of corporate income taxation at all. 29 The
Bradley-Gephardt bill, on the other hand, makes no changes in the corporate income tax, and explicitly maintains current rates, special deductions, and credits.30 Other proposals apply the current corporate
income tax rules, but with substantially lower rates. 3' Still others
would broaden the corporate tax base, lower the rates, and eliminate
individual income taxes on dividends, interest, or gains from the sale of
a business.3 2 Finally, some of the proposals attempt to conform corporate taxation to flat-rate proposals for wage or consumption taxation,
rather than to individual income taxation. 3
Coordination of corporate and other business taxation with the
fundamental base-broadening changes in individual taxation seems essential to avoid creation of new tax planning opportunities which could
defeat the purpose of base-broadening. Coordination of corporate and
individual tax rates is similarly necessary. A detailed discussion of the
changes in corporate taxation appropriate to a broad-based tax reform
is beyond the scope of this Article. Integration of corporate and individual income taxes and the appropriate treatment of corporate income
desirable presumes that considerations of efficiency, fairness, and simplicity are the motivating
force behind the flat-rate proposals-perhaps a questionable conclusion in light of the fact that
eight of the twelve current legislative proposals significantly reduce the progressivity of the rate
structure and would result in a massive shift of the tax burden. I would be against any flat-rate
proposal that substantially shifted the tax burden, and both the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation and the Treasury seem to share my concern over the distributional effects implicit in
several of the current proposals. See Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-1 1; JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-1. Moreover a shift in the tax burden of the magnitude estimated to result
from a flat-rate tax with a rate of 16%--calculated to be as high as $33 billion-renders the disposition of many transitional questions of the sort discussed here insignificant. See supra text accompanying note 22.
29. E.g., H.R. 5513, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5520.
30. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 3. Senator Bradley and Representative Gephardt have
subsequently indicated that another bill dealing with corporate taxation will be introduced in the
Ninety Eighth Congress. Telephone interview with Leslie Devlin, Assistant Press Secretary to
Senator Bradley (Jan. 10, 1983).
31. Eg., H.R. 6070, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
32. E.g., S. 2557, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
33. E.g., S. 2147, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See also R. Hall & A. Rabushka, supra note 3,
at 5-12.
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and distributions in the context of consumption taxes at the individual
level have been recently explored in considerable detail in the literature.3 4 I will, however, very briefly examine issues of business and corporate taxation.

Finally, flat-tax proposals have raised the question of whether income or consumption is the appropriate broad tax base.3 5 The advantages and disadvantages of an income tax versus a personal tax on

consumption and the problems of implementing such a tax have received great scholarly attention in the literature in the past several
years,36 and I do not intend to review those debates here. I do, however, discuss the choice between consumption and income taxes in Sec-

tion VII insofar as transitional issues are at stake.
II. PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION TO A FLAT-RATE TAX

Changing the current income tax to a broad-based low-rate income tax
would constitute a major revision of the tax system, and as the Chairman of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association has noted, this

change "would create unusually significant [transition] problems.
He was undoubtedly correct when he stated:

37

[I]t is not enough to consider fundamental tax reform in the abstract.
34. In the context of income taxation, see, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 69-72; C.
McLuRE, MusT CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwcCE? (Brookings Institution 1979); Graetz,

Dividend Relief via Shareholder Credits: Tax Preferences Under Chairman Ullman's Proposal,7
TAX NOTES 667 (Dec. 11, 1978); Nolan, Integrationof CorporateandIndividualIncome Taxes, 30
U.S.C. TAX INST. 899 (1978); Warren, The RelationandIntegrationof the IndividualandCorporate
Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REv. 719 (1981). For discussions of corporate taxation with consumption taxation of individuals, see e.g., J.KAY & M. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 175-200
(1978); INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND THE REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 233-49 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MEADE REPORT]; Graetz, Implementing a ProgressiveConsumption Tax, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1575, 1634-42 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Consumption Tax

Implementation].
35. See Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-15 to -18; Rivlin Testimony, supra note 10,
at J-26 to -27; JOINT COMMITrTEE, supra note 3, at J-1.
36. E.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE EXPENDITURE
TAX (Information Report M-84 1974); BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 21.52, 113-44; S. LoDIN,
PROOREssivE EXPENDITURE TAX-AN ALTERNATIVE? (1978) (report of the 1972 Swedish government commission on taxation) (translated into English in 1978); MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at
28-40, 150-74, 187-92; WHAT SHOULD BE TAXmD: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (J.Pechman ed.,

Brookings Institution 1980); Andrews, FairnessandthePersonalIncomeTax: A Reply to Professor
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REv. 947 (1975); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Consumption-Type Tax]; Con-

sumption Tax Implementation,supra note 34; Mieszkowski, The Choice of Tax Base: Consumption
versus Income Taxation, in FEDERAL TAX REFORM: MYTHS AND REALITIES 27 (M. Boskin ed.
1978); Warren, Fairnessand a Consumption-Type or Cash FlowPersonalIncome Tax, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 947 (1975).
37. Aidinoff Testimony, supra note 8, at 10.
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Rather, any far-reaching change in a tax system as complex as ours,
on which taxpayers have relied in making decisions, will necessarily
involve considerable complexities in the transition. Needless difficulfrom
ties will be avoided if such transitional questions are3 considered
8
the beginning as part of the basic tax reform itself.
Transitional problems were also emphasized by the Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy39 and the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office4" in their recent testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee and in a pamphlet analyzing flat-tax proposals prepared by
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation for that same Committee.4 1 None of the broad-base low-rate tax bills which have been introduced address transitional issues, although some contain delayed
effective dates.4 2

In general, there are two basic attitudes regarding transitions in
the tax law.4 The politically dominant approach to significant changes
in the tax law has been to protect the expectations of taxpayers who
have "relied" on existing law; such protection typically takes the form
of "grandfathered" effective dates." The Treasury, for example, has in
the past argued for "grandfathering" in the case of a move either to a
broad-based income or consumption tax.45 An alternative perspective
on tax law transitions, which I have advanced in greater detail elsewhere, is that neither fairness nor efficiency demands grandfathered effective dates. Rather, when the magnitude of change is large, its
impact should be reduced through delayed or phased-in effective dates
rather than grandfathering.1 This approach to transitions has been
generally endorsed by the Special Committee on Simplification of the
38. Id. at 11.

39. Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-15.
40. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 10, at J-24.
41. JOINT COMMiTTEE, supra note 3, at J-8 to -9.
42. See id. at .1-9 to -10 (discussing the various proposals).

43. The paragraphs which follow summarize a point made at greater length in Legal Transltions, supra note 10, at 60-87.
44. A grandfather rule exempts from any change in law certain transactions entered into
prior to the date of enactment. For a general discussion of grandfather rules, see Id. at 60-63.
45. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 181-315. See generally S. LODIN, supra note 36, at 12327 (transitional rules in tax system changes); MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 187-92, 198-200
(transitional effects on equity and the capital market); Committee on Tax Policy, New York State
Bar Association, Retroaetivity f/Tax Legislation, 29 TAX LAW. 21, 21 (1975) (problems in retroactive legislation); Note, Setting of Effective Datesfor Tax Legislation: 4 Rule ofProspectvity, 84
HARv. L. Rav. 436, 436-55 (1970) (rule of prospectivity ensures protection of taxpayer reliance).
46. See Legal Transitions,supra note 10 (discussing the impact of delayed, phased-in, and

grandfathered effective dates).
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Tax Section of the American Bar Association.47

The principal cause for concern by proponents of grandfathering
is the loss in wealth by persons who made decisions with the expectation that the old law would remain in effect.48 In particular, "price
changes" would occur in investments that received preferential treat-

ment under the current income tax, but would not receive such favored
treatment under a broad-based tax. The price of such assets would de-

cline because potential buyers would no longer be attracted by a taxfavored yield.49 Proponents of grandfathering have urged that such
rules protect against the alleged inequities resulting from frustration of
taxpayers' expectations that their assets would continue to receive taxfavored treatment. °
47. Simplification Committee, supra note 9, at 686.
48. See sources cited supra note 45. It is not the change in tax liabilities which occasions
such concerns. It has been estimated, for example, that under a variety of rate schedules designed
to approximate the distribution of the current income tax, the move to a low-rate broad-based tax
would produce tax increases or reductions of less than $100. This figure is less than 10% of the tax
liability for 75 to 80% of all taxpayers. Pechman & Scholz, supra note 6, at 89. A move to a flatrate tax would have substantially greater impact, however, on tax liabilities. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
49. Subsidizing the production of specified goods, through favored tax treatment or otherwise, will typically decrease the price of the subsidized goods and increase their output. The effect
of the subsidy on price and quantity would depend upon the supply and demand elasticities of the
good. If the subsidy were repealed, ceterisparibus,the output and price would be expected to
return to presubsidy equilibrium. But if certain firms were grandfathered so that the subsidies
would be continued, those firms would enjoy economic rents (in this case increased relative value).
For example, upon the introduction of a broad-based income (or consumption) tax, holders
of assets whose proceeds will not receive tax-favored treatment would tend to suffer a decline in
value as uniform unfavorable (or uniform favorable) tax treatment is extended to investments
generally. This effect will be explored with reference to state and local bonds, on the assumption
that interest on such bonds would be included in receipts under a broad-based income tax and
therefore treated similarly to the return on other investment assets.
If state and local bonds were not protected through a grandfathered effective date rule, the
value of the bonds would decline relative to other investment assets. There would then be no
difference in the value of state and local bonds and, for example, corporate bonds of similar risk.
Protecting holders of tax-favored assets by a grandfathered effective date, however, may result in
an increase in value of the asset. For example, if the income tax exclusion of interest on municipal
bonds were repealed only for bonds issued after the date of enactment, interest on previously
issued bonds would remain exempt from taxation. Because bonds are not perpetual obligations,
once the bonds outstanding as of the enactment date reach maturity all interest would be subject
to tax. The maximum supply of tax-exempt bonds would be fixed as of the date of enactment.
Since maturity dates for the bonds outstanding at that time vary, the supply of tax-exempt bonds
would subsequently shrink until all of the bonds had matured. With a grandfathered effective
date, the value of outstanding municipal bonds would rise as higher bracket taxpayers purchased
these bonds from lower bracket taxpayers. See Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 60-63.
50. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 182-83; See Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 50-52.
See also sources cited supra note 45 (analysis of transition problems especially with regard to
protection of taxpayer expectations).
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The argument, however, that reliance on existing law should be
protected as a matter of fairness is problematical and suffers from circularity. This argument, in effect, would treat recipients of tax benefits
as if they had entered into a contract with the government that precluded the government from changing the law. The argument is often
little more than an assertion that the status quo should be shielded
from normal legislative changes. But the existence of expectations cannot be used at the same time to justify those expectations. Rights
would be created, and thus fairness defined, because certain expectations have come into being. An empirical finding that expectations of
no legal changes exist would constitute both the necessary and sufficient condition for the holder of such expectations to be protected from
economic loss caused by a change in law. The existence of expectations
would thus form the entire circle.
As the Supreme Court has recognized in a different context, "Not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order."51 To
be reasonable, expectations in the tax law context should be tempered
by the subjective probability that the law will be altered. Tastes and
social conditions change, and such changes are often reflected in the
political prbcess as changes in law. Individual reliance on the status
quo simply does not suffice as a basis for either compensation or
grandfathered effective dates.
Moreover, to the extent that people regard fairness to require some
protection of expectations that are upset by a change in law,
grandfathered effective date rules will typically be inadequate to the
task.52 Nothing short of perfect stability of legal rules seems likely to
suffice since uncertainty necessarily will produce winners and losers.
Furthermore, a requirement that once a law is enacted it must remain
unchanged raises fairness problems itself, particularly in the context of
51.
52.

Home Bldg. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934).
Fairness arguments based upon an individual's reliance on the status quo tend to con-

centrate on protecting only those individuals who are nominally affected by a change in law. For
example, in the case of the exemption of state and local bond interest, advocates of protecting
losers would only protect the holders of tax exempt bonds. It has not been suggested, however,
that issuers of these same bonds, who may well have structured their financing plans on the expectation of continued tax exemption, are entitled to continuation of the exemption because of their
"reliance" interest. Nor has it been argued that individuals who demanded or supplied substitutes, with the assumption that the exemption would continue, should also be protected. If fairness depends upon individual reliance, all persons who might alter their behavior because of a tax
rule must be protected.
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law produced in a system such as ours with representative democratic
and political institutions subject to periodic changes in representation
and leadership.
Protecting reliance on the status quo seems particularly inappropriate in the context of a move from present law to a low-rate broadbased income tax. This is because a significant portion of the wealth
reductions due to the change in law will arise indirectly as a result of
the rate-reduction component. In such a move, the owners of assets
which received preferential treatment under the present income tax law
would suffer a decrease in wealth attributable, in substantial part, to the
reduction (or in the case of a move to a consumption tax, the termination 3 ) of the income tax on other investments. In other words, even if
favored treatment were retained for tax-preferred assets, the significant
reduction in tax rates alone would reduce the relative advantage of tax
favoritism and would induce price reductions of assets in many instances. It is a unique quality of "tax expenditure" or "tax preference"
provisions that, unlike direct expenditures, there are two ways to reduce them--either directly by reduction or repeal of the tax preference,
or indirectly by reduction or repeal of the tax. If, for example, both the
individual and corporate income taxes were repealed, the "Tax Expenditure Budget"54 would be reduced to zero. Repeal (or reduction) of
only the individual income tax would have the effect of making only
individual tax preferences valueless (or less valuable).
One might argue, I suppose, that the individual income tax should
not be repealed or reduced, because repeal or reduction would disadvantage individuals who, because of tax preferences, now pay little or
no tax relative to individuals who pay substantial amounts of tax and
would reduce the value of assets held by persons in the former category. But it seems odd indeed to suggest that the income tax should not
be repealed because it would make worthless provisions such as the
exclusion of capital gains or the investment tax credit which originally
were enacted to reduce taxes. Under such circumstances, the arguments for protecting those who hold tax-favored investments seem even
less compelling than in the narrower context of income tax repeal of a
particular type of tax-favored treatment, even though their disappoint55
ment (and the decline in the value of their assets) would be identical.
53. See generally Consumption Tax Implementation, supra note 34, at 1649-59 (discussing
transitional problems with consumption tax).
54. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G (Federal Budget for
1982).
55. In the context of a move to an expenditure tax, there would be the additional problem of

SOUTHERAN CALIFORNMIA LAW .REVIEW

[Vol. 56:527

Another significant criterion for evaluating transitional mechanisms is the simplicity of the transitional rule. 6 Tax simplification,
after all, has provided much of the original impetus for flat-tax proposals. 57 It is therefore essential to avoid adopting a program for transition to a flat-rate tax that will threaten the opportunity for
simplification that base-broadening with lowered rates accords. For
example, it has been suggested that capital gains which have accrued
but remain unrealized prior to the date of enactment might be
grandfathered so that the new rules would apply only to appreciation
occurring after the effective date.58 Such rules, however, would create
an inordinate amount of complexity by requiring segregation of assets
acquired prior to the change in law and valuation of those assets on the
date of enactment. For reasons of complexity alone, grandfathered effective dates should be eschewed under such circumstances.
In the current context, therefore, I would hold to my earlier conclusion that grandfathered effective dates should not be enacted to protect individual assets that receive favored treatment under present
income tax law. The relevant criterion for assessing the efficiency and
equity aspects of a change in law is the magnitude of the effects occasioned by such a change. Where the magnitude of a change and its
impact on wealth is large, concerns for efficiency and fairness may suggest that phase-in or delayed effective dates be used to mitigate that
impact.5 9 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has also recognized that phased-in effective dates can be used to "moderate wealth
changes on existing assets and provide taxpayers time to adjust. ' 60 A
phased-in effective date can be effective in achieving a desired moderation of wealth effects and can provide taxpayers time to adjust to the
new regime.61 Phased-in effective dates should be selected, however, in
a way that does not create "perverse incentives for taxpayers to make
taxing consumption from wealth accumulated after the payment of income taxes. Consumption
Tax Implementation supra note 34, at 1153-62.
56. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-8.
57. Id.at J-2; Aidinoff Testimony, supra note 8,at 2-5; Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at
J-12 to -13; Rivlin Testimony, supra note 10, at J-24.
58. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-8. A similar rule was used when the original income tax was enacted in 1913 and when the carryover rule for the basis of assets transferred at
death was enacted in 1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 1023 (repealed 1980). Another
example of special complex grandfather provisions can be found in the depreciation recapture
provisions of § 1250 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 1250 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (as
amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 202, 90 Stat. 1520).
59. Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 52-60, 64-87.
60. JOINT CoMMTTEE, supra note 3, at J-8.
61. Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 54-60.
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non-economic, tax-motivated investments during the transition

period." 62
Although delayed or phased-in effective dates may be used to miti-

gate the magnitude of a wealth change resulting from a significant
change in the tax law, these techniques are not without certain drawbacks. Termination dates of tax preference provisions, a relatively recent phenomenon, have routinely been extended by subsequent
Congresses, thereby further delaying changes in substantive rules. The

tax treatment of vacation pay, for example, was often postponed yearby-year. 63 Tax reductions enacted with a future effective date have also
sometimes been repealed as the crucial date approaches. This latter
phenomenon occurred most recently when the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 repealed substantial business tax reductions
scheduled to become effective in 1985 and 1986 through further liberalization of depreciation allowances adopted in the Economic Recovery

Act of 1981. Congress took back $11.4 billion in scheduled tax reductions on the grounds that economic performance and fiscal policy concerns which had emerged in the short interval between thf two Acts

justified repeal.'
The inability of Congress to bind future Congresses through the

use of delayed effective dates may in some cases render this device unsuitable as a means of insuring an orderly and predictable transition to
a new state of law. In the instant case, unless the delay were sufficiently
62. JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at J-8.
63. The vacation pay rule was originally made applicable to tax years after June 30, 1955.
Congress subsequently delayed the effective date of vacation pay accrual for two years in the
Technical Amendment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 8-85-866, § 8, 72 Stat. 1608 (1958). Subsequently,
Congress on five other occasions postponed the effective date of vacation pay accrual. Pub. L. No.
86-496, § 2, 74 Stat. 164 (1960) (extended to Jan. 1, 1963); Pub. L. No. 88-153, § 1, 77 Stat. 272
(1963) (extended to Jan. 1, 1965); Pub. L. No. 88-554, 78 Stat. 761 (1964) (extended to Jan. 1,
1967); Pub. L. No. 89-692, 80 Stat. 1025 (1966) (extended to Jan. 1, 1969); Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 903, 83 Stat. 711 (1969) (extended to Jan. 1, 1971). Congress finally codified the vacation pay
rule in Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 4, 88 Stat. 2108 (1974) (codified at I.R.C. § 463). Congress has
similarly extended many other deadlines. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 203(b), 90 Stat. 1520 (amending I.R.C. § 167(k) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)) (extension of the tax
incentive for rehabilitation of low-income rental housing); id. § 802(a) (amending I.R.C. § 46
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)) (extension of 10% investment credit); id. § 2107(b) (amending I.R.C.
§ 501(B) (Supp. V 1975)) (extension of welfare employment incentives).
,64. The precise tax increases estimated to result from the repeal of the accelerated depreciation provisions which would have been effective under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
are $1.5 billion in 1985 and $9.9 billion in 1986. An estimated $18.4 billion in increased taxes is
expected to be paid in 1987. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, reprintedin 16 TAX
NOTES 811, 836 (Aug. 30, 1982).
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short and reversal sufficiently unlikely because of extant and expected
political conditions (the continuation in office through the delay of the
crucial political actors might be one such example), a delayed effective
date probably will not work. Because of the necessary elimination of
tax-favored treatment of a broad range of assets and the ability of currently benefited special interest groups to mobilize their arguments for
continuation of favored treatment during the delay, the practical likelihood of moving to a broad-based income tax via a delayed effective
date provision seems slight.
If both grandfathered effective dates and a delayed effective date
are to be eschewed for the reasons set forth above, a phase-in of the
move to a broad-based tax with lowered rates seems to be the only
available course. A phase-in could be targeted rather precisely to
achieve the desired magnitude of wealth effects and to occasion appropriate movement to a new regime . 5 The principal objection to a
phased-in effective date is its complexity. 66 A phase-in, of course, is
also subject to the objection that a subsequent Congress might deflect
the law from its targeted course, but because a phase-in involves taking
immediate steps toward the ultimate goal, this objection would have
less force than against a delayed effective date. When, as here, a fundamental change in law is at stake, the greater the immediate movement
in the new direction, the greater the likelihood that the ultimate goal
will be realized as scheduled.
The task involved in phasing-in either a broad-based income or
consumption tax with lower rates-a so-called flat tax-is to find a
means of enacting the phase-in without an inordinate increase in tax
complexity, inefficiency, unfairness, or arbitrariness. Fortunately, the
tax increase on higher income taxpayers occasioned by the 1982
amendments to the minimum tax has (no doubt inadvertently) put into
place a minimum tax almost ideally suited to the function of phasing-in
65. See Legal Transitions,supra note 10, at 52-60.

66. For example, the Treasury considered a ten-year phase-in to be an appropriate transitional mechanism in moving from income to consumption taxation. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at
205, 209-11; MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 188. To minimize "inequitable distribution effects," the Treasury recommended that taxpayers be required to compute both income and expenditure tax liability and to pay the greater amount for a ten-year period. Both the Treasury and the
Meade Commission suggestions would involve a ten-year phase-in during which individuals
would be required either to compute both income and expenditure tax or to make fractional "expenditure tax adjustments" to income tax calculations. The Treasury did, however, suggest that
this requirement might be limited to wealthier taxpayers. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 214 n.12.
See infra text accompanying notes 173-88.
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a transition to a broad-based income tax with significantly reduced
rates.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MINIMUM TAX
The minimum tax concept has been a tax reform showpiece for leaders
of both political parties over the past thirteen years, and, as a somewhat
distant offspring of the "comprehensive tax base" debates,67 originated
in concerns virtually identical to those now inspiring political leaders to
call for a flat-rate tax. It is therefore fitting that the 1982 amendments
to the minimum tax provision, the third major revision since its enactment in 1969, have not only restored much of the original concept of
the provision itself but have also restructured the minimum tax so that
it is an appropriate vehicle for transition to a broad-based income tax
with low rates.
Nearly twenty years ago, in 1964, Senator Russell Long called for
the enactment of what he described as an "optional simplified tax,"
perhaps the closest prior political analogue to the comprehensive tax
base and to current fiat-tax proposals.6" In general, Senator Long's
proposal would have given taxpayers an election either to compute taxable income in the normal manner and apply the regular rates or to
apply a lower rate schedule to an expanded tax base. The expanded
base was to be computed by starting (as does the 1982 minimum tax)
with adjusted gross income as defined in section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code-generally gross income less trade and business expenses,
certain losses, and capital gains and capital loss deductions-and adding certain items now either excluded from gross income or deducted
in arriving at adjusted gross income. This tax base would have included many items now excluded from income, such as interest on state
and local debt, the excluded portion of capital gains, employees' pension and death benefits, two-thirds of Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits,69 and scholarships and fellowships. In addition, it
would have disallowed many of the deductions now available, including medical expenses, charitable contributions, certain state and local
67. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
68. See S. 3250, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The proposal was reintroduced in 1966. See S.
2760, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See generally Bittker, An Optional-SimplfifedIncome Tax?, 21
TAX L. REV. 1 (1965) (critical analysis of Senator Long's proposal); Dodyk, Tax Simplcation:
The Long,4mendment and the Mills Proposal, 25 INST. ON FED. TAX. 1443 (1967) (discussion of
simplification aspects of the Long proposal).
69. Presumably the one-third of these benefits excluded from Senator Long's expanded tax
base was a rough approximation of the return of employees' contributions. See Dodyk, supra note
68, at 1449 n.14.
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taxes, and nonbusiness interest expenses. Even this bill, however,
would have excluded from the optional tax base many items that would
be included by proponents of a comprehensive tax base-for example,
unrealized appreciation of property transferred by gift or at death, interest earned on life insurance reserves, and imputed rent on owneroccupied homes. 70 Notwithstanding Senator Long's claim that his proposal would achieve substantial simplification of the law and would
"reduce the premium enjoyed by the taxpayer who has tax lawyers and
accountants to show him ways to avoid paying taxes," the elective nature of the proposal would have required persons to compute tax using
both this method and the regular computation and would thereby have
contributed to greater income tax complexity.71
Senator Long's "optional simplified tax method" seems, however,
to have been the precursor of the minimum tax recommendation of the
1968 Treasury Tax Reform Studies of the Johnson Administration.72
Under this minimum tax proposal, an individual would have computed
tax liability under the general rules and also would have made a special
tax computation by applying tax rates equal to one-half the applicable
regular income tax rates to an expanded income base. If the special
computation resulted in a greater tax liability, the larger amount would
have been required to be paid. The expanded tax base under this minimum tax proposal would have been taxable income increased by the
following four items of tax preference: (1) tax-exempt interest on state
and local bonds; (2) the appreciation in value of property donated to
charity; (3) the excluded one-half of capital gains; and (4) percentage
depletion after the cost of the property had been recovered. A special
$10,000 standard deduction in lieu of the itemized deductions would
have been allowed in computing minimum taxable income. As a complement to its minimum tax proposal, the Tax Reform Studies included
a proposal for an allocation of itemized deductions between taxed income and exempt income with disallowance of deductions allocated to
exempt income.73
President Nixon's 1969 tax reform proposals included a "limit on
70. For a criticism of the tax base of this proposal, see Bittker, supra note 68, at 12-19.
71. 110 CONG. Rnc. 23,087-98 (1964); 109 CONG. REC. 19,706 (1963). For a criticism of the
additional complexity this bill would have required, see Bittker, supra note 68.
72.

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS,

132

(Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as TAX REFORM STUDIES]. See Graetz, The Evolution ofthe
Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976- Fewer Ttan Fifty Ways to Limit Your
Losses, 29 U.S.C TAX INST. 1, 28-39 (1977).
73. TAX REFORM STUDIES, supra note 72, at 132.
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tax preferences" and an allocation of deductions similar in effect to
those proposed by the Tax Reform Studies.74 The House of Representatives' version of the 1969 Tax Reform Act adopted the limit on tax
preferences and allocation of deductions proposals but modified the list
of preference items.7" The Senate Finance Committee eliminated both
of these provisions and substituted a new provision which it labeled a
minimum tax. This provision, however, was really an additional tax of
five percent on certain preference items applicable to both individuals
and corporations.76 The five percent additional "minimum" tax was
amended on the Senate floor: the rate of tax was increased to ten percent to be applied to the excess of the sum of tax preferences over the
amount of federal income tax otherwise imposed for the taxable year.7 7
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version with only minor modifications, 78 and this provision remained effective without major change until the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
74. Hearingsbefore theHouse Comm on Ways andMeans on the Subject ofTax Reform,91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 5060-63, 5504-05 (1969). The first $10,000 of preferences would have been exempt
under the Limitation on Tax Preference (LTP) proposal. A five-year averaging provision was also
included, and the proposal was to become fully effective after a three-year transitional period.
The following items were included as tax preferences under the LTP proposal: (1)the appreciation element in the value of property donated to charity; (2) intangible drilling expenses; (3) the
excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation on real estate; and (4) farm losses generated
because of the use of special accounting rules. The preference items under the allocation of deductions proposals were the four items included under the LTP proposal plus tax-exempt interest
and the excluded one-half of capital gains.
75. H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1646.
76. S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2041. The revenue estimated to be derived from the Senate Finance Committee minimum tax was
approximately the same as that anticipated from the House limit on tax preferences and allocation
of deductions provisions. However, the Senate version applied to both individuals and corporations while the House version and the Treasury proposal would have applied only to individuals.
77. See 115 CONG. REC. 38,297-300 (1969) (remarks of Senator Miller). The following nine
items of tax preference were included under the Senate bill: (1) the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line on real estate; (2) the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line on
personal property subject to a net lease; (3) the excess of the deduction for amortization of pollution control facilities over accelerated depreciation; (4) the excess of amortization of railroad rolling stock over accelerated depreciation; (5) the "bargain element" in qualified employee stock
options, i.e., the excess of the fair market value of the optioned shares at the time of exercise over
the option price; (6) the excess of the bad debt deduction allowed to financial institutions over the
amount that would have been allowable on the basis of actual experience; (7) percentage depletion
in excess of the adjusted basis of the property; (8) the excluded one-half of capital gains; and
(9) intangible drilling expenses.
78. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 56-58 (1982)). The Conference Committee eliminated intangible drilling expenses from
the list of preferences. A seven-year carry-forward of regular income taxes was added in 1970,
and the Revenue Act of 1971 added rapid amortization of job-training and child-care facilities in
excess of straight-line depreciation as a tax preference item.
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In 1973, the Nixon Administration selected, as it had in 1969, an
alternative minimum tax as the fulcrum of its tax reform package. This
tax would have been payable only if it exceeded the regular tax liabil-

ity.7 9 Once again, however, the alternative minimum tax approach was
rejected by the Congress, which instead opted for substantial increases
in the additional "minimum" tax provisions enacted in 1969. 0 The
minimum tax was revised in 1976 by increasing the rate from ten to
fifteen percent and replacing the $30,000 exemption and the deduction
for regular income taxes with an exemption of the greater of $10,000 or
one-half of the regular income tax liability. 1 The 1976 Act also added
79. In 1973, the Treasury proposed that the minimum tax provisions of section 56, as they
applied to individuals, be replaced by the following proposal:
The [Minimum Taxable Income] ("MTI") proposal is designed to assure that every
individual will pay a reasonable amount of federal income tax relative to the size of his
income. This will be accomplished by requiring that every individual's taxable income,
to which the present graduated tax rates are applied, be no less than his "minimum
taxable income," which is approximately one-half of his adjusted gross income expanded
to include specified tax preferences which represent exclusions from income under present law.
The minimum taxable income will be determined as follows:
(i) By adding to present law adjusted gross income the total percentage
depletion in excess of basis, the excluded one-half of net long-term capital
gains, exempt earned income from foreign sources, and the non-taxable bargain element in certain stock options to arrive at Expanded Adjusted Gross
Income (EAGI);
(ii) By subtracting from EAGI, the deductions for personal exemptions, a
$10,000 floor, extraordinary medical expenses, extraordinary casualty losses
and investment interest (and investment expenses) to the extent of investment
income to arrive at the MTI Base; and
(iii) By dividing the resulting MTI Base by two to arrive at "minimum taxable
income."
Every individual will be required to pay tax on the greater of his minimum taxable
income or his normal taxable income computed in the usual manner.
The specified exclusions and all itemized deductions will be permitted to operate
freely within the area of up to one-half of income, but in all events the other one-half of
income will be subject to income tax. Because of the $10,000 floor, the adjustments for
extraordinary medical expenses and casualty losses and other reasons, MTI will have
little or no impact on taxpayers in income brackets below $50,000.
MTI is not a form of a "minimum tax" like the provision in present law which
imposes a flat 10 percent tax on specified "tax preferences." Instead, MTI will be part of
the regular income tax structure in which the rates of tax range from 14 to 70 percent.
MTI will be a more effective solution, consistent with our graduated tax rate system, to
the problem to which both MTI and the present Minimum Tax are directed.
Limitation on Arlyfcial Accounting Losses, 1973- Hearings on General Tax Reform Before House
Comi. on Ways andMeans, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 6985-86 (1973) (footnote omitted) (testimony of
George P. Schultz, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Schultz Testimony].
80. In 1974, an influential group of Congressmen joined forces to endorse increases in the
1969 minimum tax as the major tax reform item on their agenda. These proposals took an entirely
different approach from the Treasury MTI proposal and formed the basis for the 1976 amendments. In general, they would have revised the minimum tax provisions by: (a) eliminating the
deduction for regular income taxes; (b) reducing the exemption from $30,000 to $10,000; and
(c) replacing the 10% rate with a graduated scale of rates, for example, from 10% to 20%.
81. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1549, 1550 (1976) (amending I.R.C. §§ 56-58).
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certain new items to the list of tax preferences, including itemized de-

ductions (other than medical expenses and casualty losses) in excess of

sixty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the year. 2
The 1976 reduction in the minimum tax exemption had the effect of
substantially increasing the number of persons who were required to

pay minimum tax and, in combination with the rate increase and reduction of the offset for regular income taxes, of significantly increasing
the total amount of minimum tax collected. The principal effect of ad-

ding "excess itemized deductions" as a tax preference was the imposition of an additional tax on individuals who had a high amount of
adjusted gross income but low taxable income due to large itemized
deductions, principally for interest, taxes, and charitable contributions.
The most significant effect of the minimum tax was the increase in

the tax on capital gains due to the inclusion of capital gains otherwise
excluded from income. From 1969 to 1976, the minimum tax had the

effect of increasing the maximum rate applicable to long-term capital
gains from 35 to 36.5 percent.8 3 The 1976 amendments produced a

maximum long-term capital gains rate of 39.9 percent.8 4 Moreover, a
"tax preference offset" provision of the maximum tax on earned income, adopted in 1969 as a complement to the minimum tax provi-

sions, had the potential to increase further the maximum rate on capital
gains to 49.9 percent, compared to a 50 percent maximum on earned

income.

5

(Unearned income was subject to a 70 percent maximum

82. Id.
83. See I.R.C. § 56 (1969) (amended 1982).
84. See I.R.C. § 56 (1976) (amended 1982).
85. See Graetz, supra note 72, at 9. In 1969, § 1348 was added to the Internal Revenue
Code, providing (effective in 1971) a maximum 50% rate of tax on earned income. The purpose of
the maximum tax on earned income was to reduce the incentives for individuals with substantial
earned income to engage in tax shelter activities or other forms of tax planning. This was supposed to be accomplished not only by a direct reduction in the maximum rate of tax on earnings
but also by a so-called preference offset, which had the effect of reducing the amount of earned
income eligible for the maximum tax by the individual's tax preferences for the current year. Tax
preferences for this purpose were the same as under the minimum tax of § 56, and thus, until the
Revenue Act of 1978, an individual might pay increased taxes on earned income because of the
realization of long-term capital gains. Since the deduction under § 1202 for one-half of long-term
capital gains was a preference which reduced the amount of earned income eligible for the special
50% rate, an individual eligible for the 50% maximum rate might, for example, find that his earned
income was taxed at 70 rather than 50%. If the tax preference offset for capital gains was viewed
as an additional tax on capital gains, it could have had the effect of increasing the individual's
effective rate of tax on capital gains by as much as 10%. (In certain rare cases, under the 1969 Act,
because of the treatment of tax preferences under the maximum tax, the maximum rate on capital
gains could reach 54.5%. This was changed by the 1976 legislation). The Revenue Act of 1978,
however, removed the capital gains tax preference as an offset to the amount of earned income
otherwise eligible for the 50% maximum tax rate. Thus, the 50% rate applied to earned income
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rate during this period.)
By 1978, however, Congressional concern had shifted away from
taxing high-income taxpayers who paid little tax to increasing "capital
formation."86 To a Congress concerned with increasing investment
and capital formation, the tax burden on capital gains was unacceptable, and the Revenue Act of 1978 lowered the top capital gains rate to
twenty-eight percent in two steps: first, by increasing the capital gains
exclusion from fifty to sixty percent of long-term gains, and second, by
eliminating capital gains as an item of tax preference subject to the
additional minimum tax. 87 To insure that "capital formation will be
facilitated, and every individual will pay at least a reasonable minimum amount of tax with respect to large capital gains,"' 88 Congress
substituted for the additional minimum tax an alternative minimum
tax which applied to capital gains and adjusted itemized deductions. 89
The additional minimum tax was retained only for the other items of
tax preference.
The new alternative minimum tax was computed by applying an
independent rate schedule to a new minimum tax base which included
capital gains in full. The minimum tax was payable only if the alternative tax exceeded the taxpayer's regular income tax plus the additional
preference tax (which had been somewhat revised). The new alternative minimum tax had a $20,000 exemption and rates ranging from ten
percent to a maximum of twenty-five percent on relevant income in
excess of $100,000.90
regardless of the individual's capital gains for the year. Other tax preferences, however, continued
to reduce the amount of earned income eligible for the special maximum rate.
86. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE RE ENUE AcT OF 1978, at 15-17, 251-57 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as
EXPLANATION OF 1978 ACT].

87.

I.R.C. §§ 57, 1202 (amended by the Revenue Act of 1978). A 70% tax rate -

them applicable to ordinary income

-

the top rate

applied to 40% of long-term capital gain is equivalent to a

tax of 28% of the entire gain.
88. EXPLANATION OF 1978 AcT, supra note 86, at 262.
89. I.t.C. § 55 (added by the Revenue Act of 1978). See generally EXPLANATION OF 1978
AcT, supra note 86, at 262-67 (tax reform designed to curtail deductions and exclusions by highincome taxpayers); Coven, TheAlernativeMinimum Tax: Proving.Againthat Two Wrongs Do Not

MakeA Right, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1093 (1980) (arguing that the alternative tax is inherently inequitable and unduly complicated).
90. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation described the provision as follows:
The alternative minimum tax is based on the sum of a noncorporate taxpayer's gross
income reduced by deductions allowed for the year (including deductions in excess of
gross income, if any), and by amounts included in income under section 667 (relating to
accumulation distributions from trusts), and increased by the amount of the taxpayer's
adjusted itemized deductions, and capital gains deduction. This amount then is subject

to the following alternative minimum tax rates:
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The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the maximum

alternative minimum tax rate to twenty percent to conform to the reduction of the maximum regular tax rate on capital gains, which had
been reduced to twenty percent by lowering the top rate on ordinary

income from seventy percent to fifty percent. 91

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982 sub-

stantially increased total minimum tax revenues by repealing the "additional minimum tax" provisions and broadening the tax base of the
alternative minimum tax. This base-broadening was accomplished by
adding to the alternative minimum tax base items of tax preference that
had been subject to the additional minimum tax, as well as certain
Alternative minimum taxable income
$0 to $20,000 .......................................
$20,000 to 60,000 ....................................
$60,000 to 100,000 ....................................
Over $ 100,000 .......................................

Percent
0
10
20
25

The resulting amount then is compared to regular tax liability, as increased by the
add-on minimum tax. * * * If alternative minimum tax liability exceeds regular income
tax liability, as increased by the add-on minimum tax, the greater amount is payable.
Thus, although the tax is in effect a true alternative tax, in the sense that it is paid
only when it exceeds regular tax (including any add-on minimum tax liability), as a
technical matter, the taxpayer's regular and add-on minimum taxes continue to be imposed and the amount of alternative minimum tax is the excess of the amount computed
under the alternative minimum tax rate table over the amount of the regular and add-on
minimum taxes.
For purposes of the alternative minimum tax there are two preferences. The capital
gains preference is the amount of a taxpayer's section 1202 capital gains deduction, but
does not include any deduction which is attributable to the gain from sale of a taxpayer's
principal residence.
The other alternative minimum tax preference is adjusted itemized deductions.
This preference excludes medical and casualty deductions, state and local tax deductions
and, in the case of income in respect of a decedent, amounts deducted (under § 691(c))
The remaining itemized deductions are preferences only to the
for estate taxes ....
extent they exceed 60 percent of adjusted gross income minus the medical and casualty
deductions, State and local tax deductions, and the deduction for estate taxes attributable
to the inclusion of income in respect of a decedent in a decedent's gross estate.
The foreign tax credit and refundable credits are the only tax credits which are
allowed against any alternative minimum tax liability. Thus, taxpayers paying the alternative minimum tax do not obtain the benefit of nonrefundable credits, other than the
foreign tax credit, to the extent of the minimum tax. However, in the case of the investment tax credit, the jobs credit, and the WIN credit, the Act provides that any credit
carryover or carryback from a year in which the taxpayer is liable for some amount of
alternative minimum tax, is not to be reduced to the extent of the taxpayer's alternative
minimum tax liability.
EXPLANATION OF 1978 AcT, supra note 86, at 262-67 (footnotes omitted).
The alternative minimum tax of section 55 was amended in 1980 to permit nonrefundable tax
credits, other than the foreign tax credit, to offset alternative minimum tax liability, except to the
extent attributable to capital gains or adjusted itemized deductions. Pub. L. No. 96-222,
§ 104(a)(4), 94 Stat. 215 (1980).
91. Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 101, 102, 95 Stat. 176 (1981). Under the 1981 Act, the alternative
minimum tax rates were 10% on amounts from $20,000 to $60,000 and 20% on amounts over
$60,000. The special 50% maximum rate on earned income was repealed by the 1981 legislation in
connection with the reduction of the overall top rate from 70% to 50%.
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other new preference items. The 1982 Act allows a minimum tax exemption of $30,000 and imposes a flat-rate tax of twenty percent on the
amount of the tax base in excess of the exemption.92
IV. WHY THE 1982 MINIMUM TAX AMENDMENTS MAY
BE REGARDED AS A FIRST STEP TO A FLAT-RATE
INCOME TAX
The new minimum tax imposes a flat twenty percent tax on a broadened income tax base, and is required to be paid whenever it exceeds
the regular income tax. Merely describing the 1982 minimum tax
should make it apparent that this provision might well serve as the first
step in moving toward a flat-rate (or low graduated rate) tax93 on a
broadened tax base, and closer examination confirms this view.
The disengagement of the minimum tax rates from the regular rate
schedule, which originated in 1978 with the enactment of a threebracket alternative minimum tax with a maximum twenty-five percent
rate on a limited alternative tax base, created several conceptual difficulties for a minimum tax designed only as a complement to the existing income tax. When the minimum tax is evaluated as a mechanism
of transition to a broad-based low-rate income tax, however, the independent rate structure becomes an advantage. By happenstance, the
twenty percent minimum tax rate-no doubt selected because it is the
maximum rate applicable to capital gains under present law-is perfectly apt as an approximation of a flat tax rate. If the twenty percent
rate were made generally applicable it would raise revenues in the
neighborhood of those presently produced by the individual income
tax.9 4 The massive shift in distribution of the tax burden from high

income to low and middle income taxpayers that such a generally applicable flat rate would produce, however, is precluded under the minimum tax by the combination of its $30,000 exemption and the
requirement that the minimum tax be paid only when it exceeds the tax
due under the regular rules.
92. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 201, 51 U.S.L.W. 10 (Sept. 14, 1982). See I.RtC. § 55 (amended by
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982). The exemption of $30,000 applies to
unmarried individuals; a $40,000 exemption is applicable to married couples filing joint returns.

93. For an article that shares the premise that the minimum tax provision provides a satisfactory transitional mechanism to broad-based tax reform, see Hobbet, Transitional Mechanisms to
FacilitateTax Reom, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 818 (1969).

94. See Bradford Testimony, supra note 19, at 5-7; Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J.
10; Pechman & Scholz, supra note 16, at 83. For a discussion of some of the problems resulting
from the rate structure of the alternative minimum tax, see Coven, supra note 89, at 1097.
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The primary emphasis of the minimum tax is the broadening of
the income tax base to increase taxes of high income individuals who
Congress has concluded currently avoid paying their fair share of taxes
under the regular income tax rules. Using the minimum tax as the first
step in the transition to flat-rate tax should therefore foreclose the prospect of Congress using the flat-rate tax idea as a smokescreen for eliminating progressivity in the income tax, even though a broad-based
income tax would ultimately require top rates in the range of twentyfive to thirty percent if a major shift in the distribution of the tax burden is to be avoided. Using the minimum tax as a transitional vehicle
will provide a means for identifying those flat-rate proponents who are
not interested in broadening the tax base, but are merely engaged in an
effort to find a politically acceptable means of substantially shifting the
tax burden from upper to middle income persons. Without any change
in rate, the minimum tax is well-positioned to serve as the testing
ground of Congressional will to enact the base-broadening provisions
necessary to complete the move to a more comprehensive tax base.
Moreover, the base-broadening aspects of the minimum tax resolve in a satisfactory manner a number of the thorniest political issues
which will arise in consideration of broad-base tax reform. The extent
to which a broad-based, low-rate tax achieves the advantages of simplification, economic efficiency, and horizontal equity will largely depend
on the comprehensiveness of the base-broadening revisions. A more
comprehensive base implies greater neutrality in treatment both of
sources of income and of expenditures, permits lower tax rates to produce equivalent revenues, and lessens both the opportunities and incentives for complex tax planning efforts. The ultimate goal, therefore,
of such revision should be as broad and uniform a tax base as is practical coupled with minimal rates necessary to meet revenue demands and
distributional preferences.
The 1982 minimum tax takes substantial steps in the direction of a
significantly broadened tax base, and its greatest advantage as a transitional mechanism is that it satisfactorily resolves many difficult issues
inherent in base-broadening tax reform. By viewing the current minimum tax as a first-step toward a low-rate broad-based income tax,
Congress may avoid reconsideration of many important issues simply
by accepting their treatment under the minimum tax. A detailed discussion of the base-broadening issues which will arise in the move to a
flat-rate income tax is beyond the scope of this Article, but the materials'which follow highlight some of the more critical issues.
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Perhaps the most significant advantage of the minimum tax as a
transitional mechanism is its equal treatment of capital gains and ordinary income. As the history of the minimum tax set forth in the prior
section of this Article indicates, during the period between 1969-1976,
Congress took substantial steps to reduce the disparity in rates between
ordinary income and capital gains, but in 1978 this trend was reversed. 9" At the same time, however, Congress has indicated its willingness to accept uniform taxation so long as the rate is low enough (in
the twenty to twenty-five percent range) by enacting an alternative
minimum tax which imposes an identical tax rate on ordinary income
and capital gains. Under the minimum tax provisions, such uniform
treatment has been accomplished without substantial revision of restrictions on deductibility of capital losses96 and without any "fresh
start" rule which would grandfather gains which have accrued prior to
the date of enactment. Certain important aspects of capital gains taxation await further consideration in the context of a move to a broadbased income tax-notably the treatment of gains accrued at death and
indexation-but the fundamental step of taxing capital gains and ordinary income at the same rate is accomplished under the minimum tax.
As with capital gains, the new minimum tax provisions treat itemized deductions in a manner generally consistent with broad-based income tax piinciples. Rather than denying all itemized deductions, as
some proponents of comprehensive income taxation have suggested,
the minimum tax rules allow certain deductions, often with new limitations, and disallow others; but in all cases the marginal tax reduction of
itemized deductions is significantly lessened. Charitable contributions,
for example, are allowed as under the regular tax computation, but a
dollar contributed to charity will save only twenty cents of tax under
the minimum tax, as compared with a maximum of fifty cents under
the regular computation.97 Casualty losses and medical expenses are
also allowed as under the regular income tax, but, in addition to having
a reduced value under the minimum tax, allowance of those deductions
95.

See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.

96.

At the time when the broad base is made generally applicable, some restriction on the

deductibility of capital losses will have to be considered if individuals with portfolios containing
gains and losses are to be precluded from eliminating their tax liability by realizing losses only
and offsetting them against ordinary income. This problem does not arise under the minimum tax
because it applies only when the tax exceeds the regular tax which limits deduction of capital

losses against ordinary income.
97. I.R.C. § 55(e)(1)(B) (1982).
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is substantially restricted under other provisions of the 1982 Act.98
State and local taxes are not deductible under the minimum tax, and
the interest deduction is limited to interest incurred in financing the
taxpayer's home plus an amount equal to net investment income. 99
The minimum tax thereby allows a deduction for interest on preenactment home mortgage loans and interest incurred in acquiring or substantially renovating or remodeling future dwellings, but does not
permit deduction of interest on other consumer loans or on borrowing
for investments which do not yield currently taxable investment income.' ° In so doing, it strikes a reasonable balance between the two
extremes of flat-tax proposals with regard to interest: total disallowance and full deduction.
In addition, the treatment of tax credits under the minimum tax is
very restrictive. All nonrefundable tax credits, other than the foreign
tax credit, are denied. This rule eliminates tax reductions due to the
research and experimental tax credit, 1° 1 the alcohol fuels credit, 0 2 the
residential energy credit, 03 the targeted jobs credit," 4 the WIN
credit, 0 5 the child-care credit,106 the retirement income credit, 7 and
the investment tax credit.108 No doubt, some proponents of broadbased income taxation will argue that only a deduction, not a credit,
should be allowed for foreign taxes, but this debate can await subsequent stages of the move to a flat-rate tax. Therefore, with regard to
credits, the new minimum tax rules are a significant first step indeed,
leaving only one controversy for subsequent resolution as the tax base
is further broadened.
Finally, the list of preferences under the new minimum tax rules
adds a number of other important tax deductions and exclusions avail98. I.R.C. §§ 55(e)(l)(A), (C), 165, 213 (1982). These latter provisions limit deductions for
medical expenses and casualty losses to the excess over 10% of adjusted gross income.
99. I.R.C. § 55(e)(3), (4) (1982). No deduction is allowed for interest on loans made after
July 1, 1982 for refinancing the taxpayer's home. Id.

100. The limitation to net investment income is modeled after § 163(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, originally enacted in 1969. For a discussion of the original reasons for this provision,
see Halperin, CapitalGains and OrdinaryDeductions:Negative Income Taxfor the Wealthy, 12 B.
C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 387, 388-90 (1971).
101.

I.R.C. § 44(F) (1982).

102. I.R.C. § 44(E) (1982).
103. I.R.C. § 44(C) (1982).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 44(B) (1982).
§ 40 (1982).
§ 44(A) (1982).
§ 37 (1982).
§ 38 (1982).
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able under present law to the base. 10 9 For example, by including percentage depletion and intangible drilling expenses" 0 in the minimum
tax base, Congress has crossed an important political hurdle. Using the
minimum tax as the vehicle for transition to a flat-rate tax might therefore forestall effective pleading for favorable treatment by historically
effective lobbying groups, such as representatives of the oil and natural
resources industries.
In addition, the minimum tax base includes certain items which
produce tax deferral advantages under the regular income tax rules,
such as mining exploration expenses and the excess of accelerated depredation over straight and development line depreciation (with longer
lives) on real estate."' By including such items the minimum tax now
has the effect of requiring individuals who will be subject to its provisions to forego certain tax deferral incentive provisions which would
provide more rapid deductions than would be allowed under a measure
of economic income.112
Upon relatively brief examination, it becomes apparent that the
1982 minimum tax rules have appropriately resolved a number of important issues which might otherwise become stumbling blocks in a
move to a broad income tax base subject to low tax rates: capital gains,
itemized deductions, tax credits, natural resources, and certain other
tax preferences have all been addressed by the minimum tax in a satisfactory manner. The comprehensiveness of this list is demonstrated by
its inclusion of every issue separately discussed by the Joint Committee
on Taxation in its treatment of transitional problems in moving to a
broad-based income tax.1 3 Moreover, the minimum tax base does not
include any items which are4 not reasonable candidates for inclusion in
a broad income tax base.'
109. See I.R.C. § 57 (1982). The following items of preference are addressed by the code's

provisions: (I) exclusions from gross income for dividends and interest; (2) accelerated depreciation on real property; (3) accelerated depreciation on leased personal property; (4) amortization of
certified pollution control facilities; (5) deductions for mining exploration and development costs;

(6) deductions for circulation and research and experimental expenditures; (7) depletion; (8) capital gains; (9) the bargain element of incentive stock options; (10) intangible drilling costs; and
(11) accelerated cost recovery deductions in excess of specified allowances.

110. I.R.C. § 57(a)(8), (11) (1982).
111. I.R.C. § 57(a)(2), (5) (1982).
112.

The impact of the minimum tax on such deferral items is typically so severe when it

applies that taxpayers would be better off foregoing the deferral provision altogether.
113.

rupra
See JOINT CoMMITTEE,

note 3, at J-8 to -9.

114. This is not true if a flat-rate consumption, rather than income, tax were desired. See

infra text accompanying notes 173-88.
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V.

ADDITIONAL STEPS NECESSARY TO MOVE FROM THE
CURRENT MINIMUM TAX TO A FLAT-RATE TAX

A comprehensive consideration of the steps needed to complete the
move from the 1982 minimum tax to a broad-based income tax with
low rates would require an exhaustive review of the issues taken up in
the comprehensive income tax literature, a task which I have explicitly
eschewed here. I do, however, provide a general outline of the necessary direction and note some of the most significant issues.1 1 5 My
choices in outlining subsequent steps necessary to achieve a generally
applicable broad-based income tax with low rates are influenced by my
concern for maintaining a distribution of the tax burden that is not
markedly less progressive than that of current law, and I have attempted to identify issues which are important both in terms of revenue
and in terms of establishing neutral treatment of income.1 16
Given my choice of the minimum tax as the principal transitional
mechanism, there are two types of issues that must be considered:
(1) the addition of certain currently excluded items to the minimum tax
base, and (2) the resolution of existing problems which must occur independent of the minimum tax. The primary consideration in both of
these areas is the establishment of a sufficiently broad tax base. Although the minimum tax base is considerably broader than that of the
regular income tax, it remains insufficiently comprehensive. Further
broadening is therefore essential; additional sources of both capital and
labor income must be added to the base.

A.

ADDITIONS TO THE MINIMUM TAX BASE

1. Exclusionsfrom Income
Although certain statutory exclusions of capital income are included in
the minimum tax base-for example, the exclusions of dividends and
interest, capital gains, and percentage depletion-some significant
omissions remain. Of these omissions, the exclusion of interest on state
and local bonds is the most notable." 7 From the inception of the minimum tax idea, inclusion of state and local bond interest has been controversial. Tax-exempt interest was among the items of tax preference
in the proposals of both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations in
1969, was included as a preference in the House version of the 1969
115.
116.
various
117.

For more comprehensive discussion, see the sources cited supra note 9.
See generally Pechman & Scholz, supra note 16 (calculation of the revenue impact of
preferences).
I.R.C. §§ 103, 103(A) (1982).
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Tax Reform Act, and was also included as a tax preference in the Senate version of the 1982 legislation.1 18 Yet, tax-exempt interest has
never emerged in a list of tax preferences approved by a House-Senate
conference." 9 Such interest is unquestionably a source of income
which should be included in a broad-based tax and should be added to
the minimum tax base in the transition. It may prove necessary to
compensate state and local governments for this addition by offering
direct federal interest subsidies to maintain reduced interest costs at the

state and local level,' 20 but the failure to include such interest in a
broad income tax base would be a bad omen indeed.
Present law also exempts from income interest earned on life insurance reserves whenever paid "by reason of the death of the in-

sured."'I' Income earned on savings in the form of life insurance is
thus accorded preferential treatment which should be eliminated under
a broad-based income tax. There may well be good reasons for excluding pure insurance gains even from a broad-based income tax base, but
the arguments against taxing mortality gains simply do not apply to life
insurance proceeds attributable to the build-up of life insurance
reserves.122 Accordingly, interest earned on life insurance reserves

should be included in any broad-based income tax and, along with
state and local bond interest, should be added to the minimum tax base

in the transition.
The reasons for treating the transfer of assets at death (and gift) as
an occasion for the realization and taxation of accrued appreciation
have been well discussed in the literature. 123 The provision of present

118. For a more general discussion of limitation of preference items, see supra notes 72-78
and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT ON TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1982, S.REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 110, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws
101-02 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT ON 1982 ACT].
119. But cf. I.R.C. § 291(a)(3) (1982) (inclusion of tax-exempt interest as preference for
certain financial institutions).
120. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., IstSess. 172-74 (1969) (proposing election to
issue taxable bonds with an interest subsidy from the federal government); BLUEPRINTS, supra
note 9, at 85 (proposal for a federal interest subsidy to state and local governments). To the extent
that direct subsidies are required to replace tax preferences eliminated by base-broadening, additional revenues will not be available to facilitate rate reductions. As a result, rates somewhat
higher than otherwise necessary may be required. None of the authorities discussing tax rates
applicable to a broadened tax base cited in this Article makes any adjustment for potential direct
subsidies.
121. I.R.C. § 101(a) (1982).
122. See Consumption Tax Implementation, supra note 34, at 1611-12.
123. See, e.g., Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death-An Evaluation of the Current
Proposals,59 VA. L. REV. 830 (1973); Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes- The 1968
Treasury Proposals,The Criticisms, and4 Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1970).
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law which exempts from income taxation unrealized appreciation in
assets held until death has often been called the single most important
loophole in the income tax, and Congress has on several occasions considered revising these rules. In 1976, a provision was enacted that
would have required a carryover of the decedent's basis on transfers of
appreciated property at death, but in 1980 the provision was repealed
retroactively to its date of enactment.1 24 In moving to a broad-based
income tax, the issue cannot be ignored, notwithstanding its recent history. An appropriate transitional step would be to add to the minimum
tax base both unrealized appreciation of assets held at death and unrealized appreciation of assets donated to charity."' 5 Additionally, in
light of the emasculation of the estate tax by recent legislation, consideration should also be given to including amounts received by bequest
(or gift) in the minimum tax base (and consequently the broadened
income tax base) of the recipient."2 6
As with income from capital, expansion of the minimum tax base
with regard to labor income should first occur by including a variety of
sources now excluded by specific statutory provisions. Other than deferred compensation, which will be discussed subsequently, and the exclusion for meals and lodging, which will be considered in connection
with nonstatutory fringe benefits, the principal statutory exclusions
from gross income under the current income tax are for life insur1 30
and
ance, 127 health insurance,12 8 sick pay,12 9 certain legal services,

scholarships, fellowships, prizes and awards. 13 1 In addition, the first
$75,000-$95,000 of earned income from foreign sources is tax-exempt
124. See Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 299 (1980) (repealing I.R.C. § 1023). See also
I.R.C. § 1014 (1982) (basis of property acquired from decedent).

125.

Unrealized appreciation of assets donated to charity was included as a preference under

the minimum tax in the 1969 proposals. See supra note 74.
For an argument in favor of including amounts received by gift or bequest in income,
126.

see generally Dodge, BeyondEstate and Gift Tax Reforma" Including GpisandBequests in Income,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978).
127. I.R.C. § 79 (1982). An employer's payments of premiums for up to $50,000 of group
term life insurance are excludable from an employee's income.
128. I.R.C. § 106 (1982). In certain cases employees may exclude amounts provided by employers in the form of health insurance premiums and reimbursements of an employee's uninsured medical expenses.
129. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1982). Subject to dollar limitations and other requirements, disability
payments under an employer-financed accident or health plan may be excluded from an employee's income. I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) (1982).
130. I.R.C. § 120 (1982). Amounts contributed by an employer to a prepaid legal services
plan for employees and the value of legal services received under such a plan are excluded from
employees' income under certain conditions.
131. I.R.C. §§ 74, 117 (1982). Scholarships and fellowships are generally excluded from gross
income, and prizes and awards are excluded in certain limited circumstances.
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under certain conditions.132 The Internal Revenue Code provides
other, somewhat less important, exclusions from income for: (1) combat
pay, mustering-out pay, and certain retirement pay for members of the
armed services;' 33 (2) veterans' disability, survivor, and pension benefits;' 34 and (3) the rental value of parsonages and rental disallowances
paid to ministers.' 35
Various arguments have been advanced for repealing each of these
statutory exclusions from income, and, with the possible exception of
exclusions relating to health benefits, none would be excluded from a
"comprehensive" income tax base. Broadening the base by including
these items would, of course, require reversal of explicit congressional
decisions to favor labor income of particular kinds and would disappoint their proponents (for example, labor unions that pressed for the
exclusion of certain legal services), but inclusion is essential if a broad
tax base is to be achieved. Adding these items to the list of preferences
under the minimum tax would be an important step in that direction.
2. Deductions and Deferrals

Implementation of an income-neutral tax structure also requires modification of current depreciation rules. The Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 explicitly divorced income tax depreciation rules from any concept of economic depreciation, and provided an arbitrary set of cost
recovery allowances instead.' 36 Although certain revisions were made
in the 1981 rules by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, the basic thrust of the 1981 legislation remains unchanged.
Under a broad-based income tax stripped of economic incentive provisions, depreciation rules should measure the actual cost of capital during the taxable period, namely "the reduction in value of productive
capital occasioned by use, deterioration or obsolescence."'' 37 In times
132. I.R.C. § 911 (1982).
133. I.R.C. § 112 (1982) (combat pay); id. § 113 (mustering-out pay); id. § 122 (uniformed
services retirement pay).
134. I.R.C. § 104(a)(4) (1982).
135. I.R.C. § 107 (1982).
136. I.R.C. § 168 (1982). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONo., IST
SEss. (1981), GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 67-100
(Comm. Print 1981).
137. Warren & Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor
Leasing, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1752, 1753 (1982). See also Samuelson, Tax Deductibilityof Economic
Depreciationto Ensure Invariant Valuations, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 604, 606 (1964) (deduction of economic depreciation conforms to income definition and leaves investment choices among assets
unaffected).

1983]

TR4NSITION TO

".FL4T-T4X"

of inflation, this allowance for economic depreciation should include
adjustments for increases in the general price level.
The current minimum tax rules partially correct excessive depreciation allowances by including accelerated depreciation on real property
and on leased personal property, as well as certain rapid amortization
allowances, in the minimum tax base.138 These rules, however, are inadequate for a broad-based income tax. The entire difference between
the permitted cost recovery allowance and the best estimate of economic depreciation should be included in the minimum tax base. Recent empirical work by Hulten and Wycoff'3 9 provides considerable
refinement in the estimation of economic depreciation and should help
facilitate this task, although difficulties will remain if significant inflation occurs because of the need to index depreciation to reflect price
level changes. Consideration should also be given to revising the treatment of debt-financed investment either by reversing the Crane rule,
which allows inclusion of debt-financed investment in depreciable basis, 14 0 or by further adjusting the allowance of interest deductions when
depreciable property is financed with debt. 4 ' And to the extent that
any other deferrals, accelerated deductions, or immediate deduction of
capital expenses are not currently in the minimum tax, they also would
be candidates for inclusion in the tax base.
Limiting Tax Shelters to Related Income

3.

Finally, under a truly comprehensive income tax base, the provisions
which now provide opportunities for tax shelters should be removed.
Preferential treatment of certain kinds of receipts and payments,
whether in the form of special exclusions, deductions, credits, reduced
tax rates, or deferral of tax liability, should be eliminated. During the
transition, however, we should anticipate some reluctance on the part
of Congress to eliminate all tax subsidies and to forego completely this
popular means of channeling investments to achieve various social policy goals. In the face of this reluctance, an immediate elimination of all
tax shelters may not be feasible. Fair distribution of the tax burdens
during the transition, however, seems at least to require a limitation on
138.
139.

I.R.C. § 57(a)(2), (3), (4), (12) (1982).
Hulten & Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Depreciation, in DEPRECIATION, IN-

FLATION AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 82 (C. Hulten ed. 1981).

140. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
141. See Bradford, The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings, in THE GOVERNMENT AND
CAPITAL FORMATION I I (G. Von Furstenberg ed. 1980); Warren & Auerbach, supra note 137, at

1757.
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the use of losses to shelter other income.' 42 This could be accomplished
by adding a provision to the minimum tax that allows deductions from
"tax shelter" investments to offset only income related to the investment. 4 Such an approach is now found in the minimum tax rules that
limit the deduction of interest to net investment income, 44 and close
analogies are contained in current limitations on deductions for socalled "hobby losses"' 4 5 and vacation homes. 146 A general proposal of
this sort was included in the 1973 tax reform proposals of the Nixon
Administration 47 and a limitation on the deduction of tax shelter
losses was also contained in the House of Representatives' version of
the 1976 Tax Reform Act, but the Senate rejected the idea and a limitation on losses was not included in the final version. 148
B.

PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE SOLVED INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE
MINIMUM TAX

1. Nonstatutory FringeBenefts
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code defines income as including
compensation for services whether in cash or in kind, but a wide variety of employee benefits usually referred to as "nonstatutory fringe
benefits" have been excluded from income by Internal Revenue Service
regulations, rulings, or administrative practice. l 9 Examples are employees' discounts, vacation facilities, airline and railroad passes, personal use of automobiles, and meals in free or subsidized company
cafeterias. In addition, meals and lodging are excluded by statute
under certain conditions. 50 However, the ability of certain taxpayers
142. See Shultz Testimony, supra note 79, at 6879-80. The new treatment of net operating
losses under the 1982 minimum tax amendments does not accomplish this result in all cases, but
does reduce allowable losses by items of tax preference. SENATE REPORT ON 1982 ACT, supra note
118, at 111-12, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at, 101-02. This provision would increase in
effectiveness as the list of tax preference items becomes more comprehensive.
143. See Graetz, supra note 72, at 48-50.
144. See I.R.C. §§ 55(e)(3)(B), (e)(5) (1982) (following an approach contained in § 163(d)
(1982)).
145. I.R.C. § 183 (1982).
146. I.R.C. § 280(A) (1982).
147. See Shultz Testimony, supra note 79, at 6879-80.
148. See generally Graetz, supra note 72, at 48-50 (discussion of limitation of tax shelter deductions to related income).
149. The discussion of nonstatutory fringe benefits is based upon a similar discussion of this
issue in Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPEND!TUR?., supra note 36, at 161,210-13. See also Simplification Committee, supra note 9, at 578 (the

value of fringe benefits must be allocated between personal and business benefit with the former
includible as income).
150. I.R.C. § 119 (1982).
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to obtain tax-free fringe benefits through these practices violates stan-

dards of tax equity and produces allocative inefficiencies.1 5 1 The imposition of a broad-based income tax requires that a comprehensive set of

principles for fringe benefit taxation be adopted either by legislation or
regulation.
Given the variety of fringe benefits, developing practical rules that

include most of the benefits in a broad income tax base will be extremely difficult.' 52 The basic rules must distinguish working conditions from in-kind compensation. The former would be regarded as
primarily for the benefit of the employer and therefore not includable
as income to the employee. An important noncompensatory business

purpose for providing the good or service in question to an employee
should be a prerequisite for exclusion. In other words, benefits would

not be excluded unless the good or service was related to the nature of
the employee's work and was something ordinarily useful to someone

in the employee's position."'
151. The horizontal equity standard is violated whenever the availability of tax-free compensation varies significantly among jobs, for example, as between union and nonunion workers.
Similarly, to the extent that the taxation of an item depends upon whether it is furnished by
employers, whether employers reimburse employees' expenses in obtaining the item, or whether
employees bear the costs of the item directly, horizontal equity will typically be violated. Close
coordination is therefore required between rules that include employee benefits in the tax base
and those that allow employees or self-employed persons to deduct items of compensation as
business expenses. Particular care will have to be exercised under a broad-based income tax to
prevent highly compensated persons from structuring their remuneration so as to receive a maximum amount of compensation in the form of fringe benefits.
Moreover, when significant amounts of compensation are excluded from the tax base, employers are given an incentive to provide such compensation. For example, if employees were
subjected to a 25% marginal tax rate, they would prefer $76 of tax-free compensation in kind to
$100 of taxable wages. Employers would likewise prefer paying $76 to paying $100, since there
would be no difference in treatment at the employer level. The lower relative cost of in-kind
benefits produces economic biases, which induce employees to take a significant proportion of
their compensation in the form of excluded benefits. By the same token, such exclusions tend to
induce labor to shift to situations amenable to the provision of excluded compensation.
152. Under the existing income tax, the Internal Revenue Code and current regulations are
overly broad and largely uninformative. Little published guidance is available to either taxpayers
or revenue agents. A discussion draft of proposed regulations relating to fringe benefits was published in 1975 by the Treasury but was subsequently withdrawn, and the Internal Revenue Service
has recently been precluded by Congress from publishing either a comprehensive set of regulations or a complete set of examples through issuance of revenue rulings.
153. A benefit provided at the employer's place of business should be more likely to be characterized as a working condition, but this should not be determinative. Other relevant factors,
none of which alone should be determinative, include the following: (1) Did the employee have
an option to accept or reject the good or service? If so, this would argue for inclusion. (2) Was the
good or service something that the employee would normally pay for out of after-tax dollars? If
so, this would argue for including the amount as compensation. (3) Was the good or service
provided to the employee's family? If so, it would most likely be regarded as compensation.
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Unlike other issues considered in prior sections of this Article, the
wide variety of nonstatutory fringe benefits makes their inclusion in the
minimum tax base seem neither desirable nor practical. Rather, a more
appropriate step toward broad-based taxation would require Congress
or the Treasury to develop rules directly including such amounts in
gross income under section 61, a task which will not be an easy matter,
either politically or administratively. As a practical alternative, Congress should consider disallowing deductions to employers for fringe
benefits that are difficult to value or allocate to particular employees.
Total exclusion of such items from the tax base is not acceptable under
a broad-based income tax.
2. DeferredCompensation

The treatment of deferred compensation likewise poses a difficult issue
which does not seem readily susceptible to resolution by amendment of
the minimum tax. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act
of 1982 substantially modified the rules relating to the exclusion of deferred compensation from income,' 54 but the basic approach of the
Code, which allows exclusions of employer contributions to pension
plans from the current income of employees, and permits selfemployed individuals somewhat similar benefits, has not been
changed. 155 The exclusion from income of limited amounts put aside
in "Individual Retirement Accounts" is also continued. 156 The question of the appropriate treatment of such amounts under a broad-based
income tax has been subject to debate, and favorable treatment of limited amounts of deferred compensation seems justified even under a
broad-based income tax to mitigate somewhat the necessary income tax
bias in favor of present as opposed to future consumption. The Bradley-Gephardt bill deals with the deferred compensation issue by impos(4) Was the good or service provided routinely or only sporadically? If the former, inquiries
should be made to determine whether it was part of the negotiated wage structure and therefore
something the employee expected as compensation.

To convert such general principles into a workable system, Congress or the Treasury must
provide a reasonably comprehensive set of examples indicating whether particular goods or services are includable in an employee's receipts and, if so, at what value. De mrnmisr rules and
reasonable rules for the valuation and allocation of fringe benefits are also essential to effective

fringe benefit taxation. If the principles described above were adopted, items such as supper
money, employee discounts, free admission to athletic or entertainment events, employees' use of
vacation facilities and country club memberships, meals and lodging provided to employees, and
interest-free loans provided to employees would be includable in income tax receipts.
154. Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 235-254, 51 U.S.L.W. 10 (Sept. 14, 1982).
155. See I.R.C. §§ 401-415 (1982) (deferred compensation, pension, profit sharing, and other
benefits partially excluded from tax liability).
156. I.R.C., § 219 (1982).
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ing a tax of fourteen percent on currently exempt pension and other
retirement funds, an approach also suggested by the Treasury in
Blueprintsfor Tax Reform.' 57 Retirement benefits from the government, such as social security benefits, railroad retirement benefits, and
should probably be included in income under a
veterans' pensions
158
broad-based tax.

For present purposes, it is sufficient to note only that the question
of the appropriate treatment of deferred compensation, including the
treatment of employer and government based plans, requires resolution
as a broad-based tax is considered, and, if past congressional action is
any guide, will undoubtedly result in particularized compromises. Like
fringe benefits, deferred compensation does not seem to be an appropriate subject for potential addition to the list of tax preference items
under the minimum tax, and this aspect of transition to the broadbased income tax should be dealt with outside the minimum tax
context.
3. Transfer Payments
Consideration should also be given to expanding the broad tax to include government transfer payments in addition to fringe benefits and
deferred compensation. Payments such as social security benefits and
veterans' pensions, now excluded from gross income, 159 are indistinguishable from wages and other income and should therefore in theory
be included in the income tax base.' 60 For many in-kind transfers, valuation would be difficult. Moreover, since the level of government
transfers is presumably determined on the assumption that they are tax
free, taxation would simply necessitate an increase in their level and
perhaps an adjustment in tax exemptions and rates. As a practical matter, then, the income tax base should include only transfers that are not
based on need and are either cash or easily valued if in kind.
157.

BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 56-58.

158. See, e.g., id (employer contributions to pension fund excluded from employees' tax
base). If receipts are included in full, deductions should be allowed for individuals' contributions
to such plans; otherwise a portion of the receipts should be excluded. See supra note 69.
159. Despite the absence of specific statutory authority, the long-standing policy of the Internal Revenue Service has been to exclude payments received under welfare legislation from income. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-605, 1972-2 C.B. 35 (veterans benefits); Rev. Rul. 70-280, 1970-1

C.B. 13 (unemployment benefits); Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 12 (social security payments).
160. If such payments were not included in the income tax base, advantages would result to
recipients depending on their marginal tax brackets, with higher bracket taxpayers obtaining a
relatively greater advantage from exclusion. Where individuals contribute to such plans, however,
deductions should be allowed. See Sunley, Employee Benets and TransferPayments, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 9, at 76-77.
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The Taxation of Business Entities

Although detailed consideration of the issues of corporate taxation is
beyond the scope of this Article, there is considerable controversy over
how corporate income should be taxed, and a few general observations
are in order. First, the dominant analytical posture concerning a
broad-based individual income tax is grounded, at least partially, in the
notion that all income should be taxed equally regardless of its source.
Under this view, taxation of income at the corporate level is merely a
mechanism necessary to ensure that undistributed corporate income
does not escape taxation. 6 ' This theoretical posture suggests both a
criticism and appropriate revision of the current corporate income tax.
The separate corporate income tax should be repealed and undistributed corporate income should be directly attributed to shareholders
and taxed at their marginal rates.' 62 If a corporate income tax were
continued, it should apply only to earnings retained by the corporation
on the grounds that attribution of undistributed corporate income to
shareholders is impractical. 63 Any corporate tax would only serve as a
withholding tax to be credited to shareholders as corporate income is
distributed or attributed to them. If an expenditure tax or a consumption tax were implemented at the individual level, the corporate tax
should be repealed. 64 Alternatively, a corporate tax might be retained
as a means of collecting tax on preenactment
for corporate6distributions
5
investments.1
Experience has shown that a corporate tax that varies substantially
in its level of rates and tax base from the individual tax structure produces misallocations of resources and inequities because of the ease
with which corporations can be formed.166 The widespread incorporation of individuals engaged in personal services to take advantage of
either lower corporate tax rates or advantages for corporate pension
and retirement plans provides ample illustration of this point. Both the
corporate tax base and the corporate rate structure must therefore be
coordinated with the broad-based, low-rate income tax implemented at
the individual level. The approach of the current Bradley-Gephardt
161.
(1973).
162.
note 34,
163.
164.

R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 270-71
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 69; C. McLuRE, supra note 34, at 146-84; Warren, supra
at 739-41.
C. McLURE, supra note 34, at 215-19; Warren, supra note 34, at 740.
Chapoton Testimony, supra note 8, at J-16; Consumption Taxlmpementaion,supra note

34, at 1634-42.

165. MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 233-35.
166. C. McLuRE, supra note 34, at 6; Warren, supra note 34, at 736-38.
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bill, which makes no changes in the corporate income tax, leaving both
and credits generally unaffected, therefore
rates and special deductions
167
accepted.
be
cannot
If the Congress were to agree to move to a broad-based, low-rate
income tax at both the individual and corporate level, a phased-in approach to corporate tax revision could also be accomplished. Again,
the 1982 amendments, which cut back on corporate tax preferences,
point the way. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
contains provisions which reduce certain specified corporate tax preferences by fifteen percent. Further reductions in such preferences could
be accomplished in conjunction with a phased-in elimination of the tax
on corporate earnings distributed to shareholders as dividends, or
through general reductions in corporate tax rates. To minimize distortions in the allocation of resources and limit tax planning opportunities
which will produce complexity in the operation of the tax law, as well
as inefficiency and unfairness in terms of horizontal equity, the corporate tax rate (which would presumably apply only to retained earnings)
should be lowered if the top rate for individuals is reduced from its
current fifty percent level to the twenty-five to thirty percent range.
The new rate should be set at a level equivalent to the flat-rate applicable to individuals or at a level which approximates the top rate which
will be applicable to a low-rate broad-based individual income tax.
5. Indexation
Inflation produces two kinds of problems for an income tax. First, the
substantive impact of tax brackets and specified dollar amounts
changes if no adjustment is made for price level changes. The need for
indexation of such amounts would remain under a broad-based low
rate income tax if inflation is significant in the years ahead.' 6 8 Second,
an income tax base in a variety of circumstances requires dollars from
different time periods to be taken into account in measuring gain or
loss. The major instances where this problem arises involve depreciation deductions, inventory accounting, and gain or loss on the sale of
assets and debt. Lowering tax rates and broadening the tax base may
167. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 3. But see supra note 30 (Senator Bradley and Representative Gephardt have indicated that a corporate taxation bill will be introduced in the Ninety
Eighth Congress). The Chairman of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association has similarly concluded that "adoption of a flat-rate tax for individuals cannot be considered apart from
the taxation of business entities." Aidinoff Testimony, supra note 8, at 9.
168. I.R.C. § 1(f), added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, currently provides for
such indexation effective beginning in 1985.
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lessen somewhat the impact of inflation in distorting an income tax
-base, but the basic difficulty remains unchanged. As a theoretical matter, basis of assets should be indexed to reflect inflation, and principal
and interest amounts of debt should also be adjusted as price levels
change. In moving to a broad-based, low-rate income tax, Congress
must necessarily weigh the need for such. adjustments against the com69
plexity they would necessarily produce.'
VI.

COMPLETING THE TRANSITION TO A LOW-RATE
BROAD-BASED INCOME TAX

When the minimum tax base has been broadened as suggested in the
prior sections of this Article, and other significant base-broadening issues, such as those previously discussed, have been resolved, only one
step remains to complete the transition to a broad-based income tax:
the establishment of the proper level of personal exemptions and rates
of tax.
Once the corporate and individual tax bases have been established, rates can be set to produce the desired level of revenues and
distribution of the tax burden. 7 0 Thus, after Congress has resolved tax
base issues, the minimum and regular tax provisions should be integrated both with an exemption level designed to make the broad-based
tax widely applicable to all but those at the poverty level, and with tax
rates appropriate to achieve the desired distributional consequences.
Proceeding to a broad-based, low-rate tax by first expanding the minimum tax base should provide important information concerning the
tax base that will ultimately be made generally applicable and should
eliminate a vast number of disputes over transitional issues. For high
income taxpayers, the minimum tax will gradually become more generally applicable during the transition notwithstanding its high exemption of $30,000. At this stage, taxpayers above that level of income will
be paying tax on a broad base at a rate equal to twenty percent (at a
minimum), and will pay higher taxes if the regular present income tax
rules apply. When the broad-based tax becomes the generally applicable tax, some increase in the twenty percent rate should be possible
without introducing new transitional issues or resurrecting issues which
have been dealt with through the minimum tax. Certainly a top rate of
169. For a more detailed discussion of the indexation issue, see INFLATION AND THE INCOME
TAX (H. Aaron ed. 1976); MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 99-122; Simplification Committee,
supra note 9, at 589.
170. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. See also Chapoton Testimony, supra note
8, at J-10 to -11 (discussion of distributional effects of different rate structures).
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twenty-five percent, which the Treasury Department and others have
suggested could achieve a similar distribution of income tax burdens as
present law,17 1 or the twenty-eight percent rate which Senator Bradley
and Representative Gephardt have used in an effort to achieve a distribution of the tax burden identical to present law,' 72 should not raise
new transitional issues. Changes in tax rates of this magnitude have
occurred throughout the history of the income tax. Moving to a flat
rate, however, would impose a substantial new burden on middle income taxpayers and would introduce additional transitional issues.
VII. ALTERNATIVE TRANSITIONAL STRATEGIES IF A
FLAT-RATE CONSUMPTION (RATHER THAN
INCOME) TAX IS DESIRED
If progressive tax rates were not desired and a genuine flat-rate tax on
consumption were preferred to an income tax, such a tax should take
the form either of a retail sales tax, similar to that used widely in the
states, or a value-added tax, such as those used in other industrialized
countries throughout the world.' 7 3 While these taxes are generally imposed on less than a full consumption base, such a tax should be applied to a broad base at the federal level. The typical value-added or
retail sales tax bases should be expanded to include services such as
medical and hospital care services, financial services, foreign travel,
and rental payments. 7 4 Relatively simple mechanisms could be
adopted to avoid enacting a regressive tax and to insure that a valueadded or retail sales tax would be roughly proportional to a person's
income.
To move in this direction, a value-added or retail sales tax should
be enacted concurrently with the phasing-out of the income tax. If a
broad-based national value-added or sales tax were applied to the majority of taxpayers and a distribution of the tax burden approximating
that of current law were desired, consideration should be given to retaining an income tax for upper-income individuals. The minimum tax
of the 1982 Act, perhaps .with the base-broadening amendments suggested in prior sections of this Article, might well serve the income tax
function. Only if an individualized, progressive tax on consumption
were desired should Congress consider a so-called expenditure tax,
171. Eg., Bradford Testimony, supra note 19, at 5-7; Pechman & Scholz, supra note 16, at 85.
172. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 3.
173. See generally J. DuE, SALES TAXATION (1957); MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 228-45;
Consumption Tax Implementation, supra note 34, at 1578-80.
174. See J. DUE, supra note 173, at 374-75.
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under which consumption would be computed indirectly by deducting
amounts saved from receipts available for consumption or savings.175
Proponents of such a tax argue that any move to a broad tax base
should take this course rather than taxing income.
William Andrews, the principal architect of current broad-based
expenditure tax proposals, following a suggestion by the prior generation's leading expenditure tax proponent, Nicholas Kaldor, 176 has recommended that transition to an expenditure tax should be
accomplished by first phasing-in a "supplemental personal expenditure
tax" appliable to high-income individuals.1 77 Andrews' proposed tax
would basically be a graduated cash-flow expenditure tax designed to
replace the portion of the income tax in which marginal rates equal or
exceed forty percent. An exemption of about $30,000 to $35,000
($40,000 to $45,000 for joint returns) would exempt those taxpayers below the forty percent marginal income bracket from tax as under the
current minimum tax. Professor Andrews argues that such a tax would
maintain the progressivity of current income tax law, while eliminating
"the worst distortions and inequities in the existing [income] tax [that]
result from the application of very high marginal rates to a base in
which there are [wide] disparities in the treatment of investment returns." 78 Existing disparities in the treatment of such returns would be
maintained in the basic income tax (at least during a transition to a
universal expenditure tax), but the supplemental expenditure tax would
be imposed on a comprehensive consumption tax base which79would not
provide tax incentives for particular kinds of investments.
Professor Andrews' proposal is related to a suggestion advanced
by the Meade Commission, which urged a consumption tax base for
Britain.1 s0 The Meade Commission also considered a graduated expenditure tax, limited in application to higher bracket taxpayers, to
ease the transitional problems of moving to a generally applicable expenditure tax.' 8 ' It would, however, have combined a graduated ex175. Consumption Tax Implementation,supra note 34, at 1577-78. See also sources cited supra
note 36 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of an income tax versus a personal tax on

consumption).
176. N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 224 (1955).
177. Andrews, A SupplementalPersonalExpenditure Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?, supra note 36, at 129.
178. Id. at 137-39.
179. Id. at 142-50.
180. MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 204-15, 442-46.
181. Id. at 213.
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penditure tax with a single basic rate of tax on consumption (in the
form of a value-added tax), rather than with an income tax.
The most troubling aspect of Andrews' proposal is its treatment of
savings. Professor Andrews argues that adopting a supplemental personal expenditure tax in place of income tax rates over forty percent
would provide "relief for savers" on a much more "coherent and uniform basis" than the many special provisions of the current income tax.
He concludes that "[b]ecause of the structure of the change the greatest
relief would be given those whose savings are now most severely
taxed."1" 2 While this is certainly true, the fact that the proposal provides a tax advantage only for the savings of persons with taxable income of $30,000 to $35,000 or more raises serious questions about its
fairness. The Meade Commission would avoid this difficulty by providing an advantage for the savings of all taxpayers. Its combination of
a value-added tax and a supplemental graduated expenditure tax therefore seems far preferable to Andrews' income-expenditure tax
combination.
Detailed proposals for a transition from income to expenditure
taxation have also been offered by a Swedish study 8 3 and by the
United States Treasury."8 ' Both the Treasury and the Swedish studies
recommend exclusion from the expenditure tax base of all assets held
at the date of enactment (without regard to the owner's age) but to
minimize "inequitable distributional effects" of such treatment, the
Treasury recommends that taxpayers be required to compute both income and expenditure tax liability for a ten-year period and to pay the
greater amount.' 85 The Treasury suggests that this requirement might
be limited to wealthier taxpayers, and thus in effect recommends a tenyear period during which a broad-based expenditure tax would serve as
an alternative minimum tax, payable whenever it exceeds the regular
income tax. 186
Under the Treasury's plan, a broad-based consumption tax would
182. Andrews, supra note 177, at 141.
183. S.LODIN, supra note 36, at 123.
184. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 9, at 209.
185. Id. at 205, 209-11, 214 n.12. The Meade Commission also suggests the possibility of
phasing-in the expenditure tax by substituting an additional one-tenth of the expenditure tax base
for the income base each year for ten years. MEADE REPORT, supra note 34, at 188.
186. I too have argued elsewhere that a graduated expenditure tax might be used as a minimum tax. Graetz, supra note 72, at 53. For this purpose an expenditure tax should be an alternative to the income tax-payable by taxpayers with substantial incomes (say over $30,000)
whenever it exceeds the regular income tax liability-not a tax generally appliable to all upperincome taxpayers in lieu of the income tax, as recommended by Professor Andrews.
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therefore be approached, as has been suggested here for a broad-based
income tax, by using a minimum tax as a transitional device. However,
in the case of a broad-based consumption tax, the 1982 minimum tax
amendments would be largely useless in providing a first step. If a consumption tax were desired, the minimum tax of current law should be
over time
replaced with a new consumption-based minimum tax, which
87
would become the generally applicable broad-based tax.
A more direct route to an expenditure tax is possible, but the transitional problems are substantial. I have argued elsewhere that if a
broad-based progressive tax on consumption is desired, a relatively restrictive attitude should be adopted with respect to claims for transi188
tional relief, with such relief generally limited to elderly taxpayers.
The current generation of elderly taxpayers has been subject to income
tax during preretirement years, and it therefore seems inappropriate to
subject the elderly to a consumption tax during retirement, since they
will not have received any of the advantages to savings provided by
expenditure taxation during their working years.
CONCLUSION
By happy coincidence, Congress has strengthened and made coherent
the provisions of the minimum tax just as it begins serious consideration of moving to a "flat-rate income tax"-a broad-based income tax
with substantially lowered rates. In this Article, I have urged that the
1982 minimum tax amendments should be regarded as the first step in
the move to a flat-tax. It is an important first step indeed, since the new
minimum tax has satisfactorily resolved such major potential difficulties under a broad-based income tax as the treatment of capital gains,
itemized deductions, and tax credits, and has partially resolved other
187. If a progressive broad-based tax on consumption were desired by the Congress, it would
be possible to approach such a change by replacing the alternative minimum tax adopted in the
1982 legislation with an alternative minimum tax based on consumption and then to extend the
consumption tax to all taxpayers. Such a course of action would not be an extension of the present
minimum tax, but would require the substitution of a different minimum tax base. Some aspects

of the 1982 amendments to the minimum tax would be helpful, though, in moving to a
consumption-based minimum tax. The similar treatment of ordinary income and capital gains,
the limits on itemized deductions, and the denial of tax credits are a few examples. Other provisions, however, such as the inclusion of accelerated depreciation and deductions for intangible

drilling and mining expenses, move in the wrong direction. A restructuring of the tax would be
necessary in any event to ensure the taxation of consumption and not of savings. For example, a
general deduction should be allowed for savings, and borrowed amounts should be included in

receipts. See generally Consumption Tax Implementation, supra note 34 (discussing the practical
difficulties of a tax on personal consumption).
188. Id. at 1656-58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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important issues, such as those concerning depletion and depreciation.
Moreover, by using the minimum tax as the vehicle for transition, the
difficult political issue of setting broad-based income tax rates and exemptions may be postponed until base-broadening issues have been resolved, since the minimum tax rate now applicable is generally within
the range considered appropriate by flat-tax advocates.
Further base-broadening is the necessary next step in the transition and some important additions to both the minimum tax and regular income tax rules have been discussed here. If, for example,
Congress were to add to the list of minimum tax preferences interest on
state and local bonds and on life insurance reserves, unrealized gain on
assets transferred by death and gift, the excess of allowable depreciation over economic depreciation, and the principal statutory exclusions
from wages, a major second step would be accomplished. Other issues
would still require resolution. The taxation of fringe benefits and deferred compensation are two important examples which have been discussed in this Article. Revision of the taxation of income from
corporations and other entities will also have to be considered. In particular, the elimination of the corporate tax on amounts distributed to
89
shareholders as dividends would seem an appropriate change.1
I do not mean to suggest here that the subsequent steps to a broadbased income tax will be easy or politically noncontroversial. I merely
want to emphasize that if such a tax is indeed the goal of forthcoming
tax reform efforts, many of the most difficult issues have already been
hurdled by the 1982 revisions of the minimum tax. Further broadening
of the minimum tax base can serve as a testing ground of Congressional
will to enact a uniform comprehensive income tax while restricting any
tendency to use flat-tax proposals as a device for a substantial shift in
the tax burden from upper to low and middle income taxpayers. Selection of the minimum tax as the transitional vehicle should preclude the
use of broad-based tax reform simply as a guise for the elimination of
progressivity.
On the other hand, if the ultimate goal is a broad-based progressive tax on consumption, and if a minimum tax on consumption were
to serve as the transitional mechanism to that tax, as the Treasury has
suggested, a different sequence of events would be required. As a first
step, the minimum tax of present law would have to be restructured to
apply to a consumption, rather than to an income base.
189.

See the sources cited supra note 34.

